InfoGram

July 25, 2002

NOTE: This InfoGram will be distributed weekly to provide members of the emergency services sector with news and information concerning the protection of their critical infrastructures. For further information please contact the U.S. Fire Administration's Critical Infrastructure Protection Information Center at (301) 447-1325 or email at usfacipc@dhs.gov.

Protecting the Infrastructures of First Responders

When communicating with chief officers around the United States, the CIPIC often hears about how a cooperative relationship between municipal fire and police departments improves the protection of each organization's critical infrastructures. Considering the frequency of natural and man-made disasters throughout the nation, these positive associations are essential for emergency first responders and the residents of their community.

In the May 30th InfoGram, the CIPIC reported about how the New York City fire and police commissioners have begun exchanging liaison officers to improve communications and cooperation between the two agencies. Since then, the CIPIC learned about another superb example being formalized by the fire and police departments of Charlottesville, Virginia.

Discussions began in Charlottesville nearly two years ago between senior fire and police officers. Significantly enhanced community effectiveness derived through an outstanding rapport among local emergency first responders was their goal. More recently, their gatherings have matured into local and regional unified command breakfasts and luncheons. As a result of these productive meetings, both departments developed enough trust and confidence to initiate procedures for incident command and for sharing information, technical expertise, training, equipment, logistical support, as well as professionally and socially rewarding events.

The deputy fire chief indicated this week that there is tremendous optimism these arrangements will be completely successful and their original goal will soon be achieved. Additionally, he expressed that critical infrastructures of first responders will be better protected because of the established procedures and mutual aid agreements between "the badges."

This remarkable and desirable cooperation is a definite "win-win" for the Charlottesville fire and police organizations. However, it is a much bigger victory for the citizens who will be served in a far more efficient manner. Hence, the CIPIC suggests that the actions of these departments warrant emulation at those locations where discord may exist. Critical infrastructure protection excellence depends on quality, dedicated teamwork among all emergency first responders.

Local CIP Commitment

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) does not begin at the White House, the Capitol Building, or at the Pentagon. It begins with local people such as mayors, town council members, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, and police, all supported by the citizenry. It happens because these key individuals recognize and accept CIP as a commitment to the safety, security, and continuity of their "community" of people and property.

Communities have been and always will be on the front lines in the effort to prevent or mitigate deliberate, natural, or accidental attacks. The extent to which these attacks disrupt or destroy the "community" depends on the commitment of local people to CIP. The CIPIC maintains that municipalities risk commitment to misguided and costly actions without knowing and practicing the CIP process.

Although many localities have already reasonably identified their critical infrastructures (assets and systems vital to security, governance, and public health and safety), how many of these places have also determined which critical infrastructures are credibly threatened and vulnerable? Recognizing that everything cannot be protected, the commitment must be to protect first those people, physical entities, and cyber systems that are most threatened by and vulnerable to exploitation or attack by people, nature, or HazMat accidents.

Given the nationwide reality of scarce resources, particularly money, local leaders cannot afford to protect those infrastructures that are not threatened and vulnerable. Therefore, to assist "communities" with a resource-restrained and time-efficient methodology to protect those things that really need protection, the CIPIC developed the CIP Process Job Aid. This fourteen page word document (81KB) can be downloaded from the following URL: http://www.usfa.fema.gov/fire-service/cipc-jobaid.cfm

Secondary Explosions

American intelligence sources recently revealed that during tactics courses at training camps in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda operatives were trained to plant multiple explosive devices set to detonate at different times in order to specifically target emergency first responders. Although there are no known cases of al-Qaeda terrorists using this technique during an actual operation, a number of extremist groups worldwide have employed secondary explosives. In 1997, there were two confirmed bombing incidents in the United States involving secondary explosive devices. Both events are suspected to have been perpetrated by FBI Top Ten fugitive, Eric Robert Rudolph.

Security experts advise that there is no cause for an over-reaction to this information by members of the first response sector. Instead, they recommend diligent caution when responding to incidents that appear to be terrorist initiated. The CIPIC suggests that it would be prudent to review response plans regarding this matter. During this review and actual execution, incident commanders and staff should consider keeping themselves at safe distances, and economizing responding forces and apparatus until the adjacent areas are adequately searched and cleared.

Truck Bomb Indicators

The FBI has no information to acknowledge that a truck bombing of any kind is currently being planned. However, analysts at the bureau believe that a truck bombing by terrorists may be preempted if the general public remains alert for certain indicators. While the existence of one of the following indicators does not suggest that such an attack is being contemplated, the FBI states that further investigation would be warranted.

• Theft of explosives, blasting caps, or fuses.
• Rental of self-storage space.
• Delivery of chemicals directly to the storage facility.
• Rental, theft, or purchase of a truck or van with large carrying capacity.
• Modification of truck or van with heavy duty springs for heavier loads.
• Small test explosions in rural or wooded areas.
• Treatment of chemical burns or missing fingers/hands.
• Untreated chemical burns or missing fingers/hands.
• Purchase of, or illegal access to, facility blue prints.