InfoGram

May 2, 2002

NOTE: This InfoGram will be distributed weekly to provide members of the emergency services sector with news and information concerning the protection of their critical infrastructures. For further information please contact the U.S. Fire Administration's Critical Infrastructure Protection Information Center at (301) 447-1325 or email at usfacipc@dhs.gov.

First Responder CIP Strategy Development

Tom Ridge's Office of Homeland Security is presently developing a national strategy, which is scheduled for release in July. But what about the states and local governments? Should they wait until they can examine and use the national strategy? The CIPIC suggests that it would be unproductive for states, counties, and municipalities to wait on the Federal Government. Given the many complexities and challenges of national strategy design, the potential for obstacles with delays is an unfortunate reality. So what should state and local governments do? The answer is to develop their own strategies that promote targeted, essential, cost efficient, and sustainable countermeasures for first responder critical infrastructures that are threatened and vulnerable.

The CIPIC recommends that local critical infrastructures (e.g., police, fire/EMS, and medical departments) implement the critical infrastructure protection (CIP) process to reliably determine what people, physical entities, and cyber systems really need protection at their municipal level. After considering the realistic interdependencies among the assets requiring protection, each department should develop a CIP strategy that defines success with specific qualitative or quantitative outcomes. A quality strategy document will schedule the completion of first responder infrastructure protection projects based exclusively on existing infrastructure vulnerabilities. It will additionally contain provisions to meticulously track how money is allocated and expended to reduce or eliminate each prioritized infrastructure vulnerability. A copy of the completed and approved first responder strategy document should be forwarded to the appropriate local emergency planning committee (LEPC) for review and consolidation.

Upon receipt of these strategy documents, LEPCs can eliminate duplication and identify other vulnerable infrastructures not already designated for protection. When this is done, each LEPC is ready to institutionalize a comprehensive strategy that protects only those first responder infrastructures that really need protection. With reliable strategy input from each LEPC, county commissioners can subsequently formulate their respective first responder CIP strategies that should be forwarded to state governors. It is understandable that large cities may desire to directly deliver their strategy to the governor's office. Preliminary indications are that state executives will prepare their First Responder Grant Program requests based on these strategies. This program, different than the Firefighters Grant Program, was proposed by President Bush for Fiscal Year 2003. At this time, it appears that state grant submissions will be sent to FEMA, perhaps through the appropriate FEMA Region Director, for final determination regarding how much program money will eventually be awarded to eligible states. Having a valid strategy from the counties or major cities in the state should raise a governor's confidence when making the tough decisions on how to effectively disperse whatever federal grant money it receives.

Until communities and their emergency services departments have developed a first responder CIP strategy, there will be no sensible methodology to apply scarce resources against existing infrastructure vulnerabilities that could lead to serious death and destruction. Remember, the primary focus of the strategy development effort is on reducing or eliminating infrastructure vulnerabilities. Such actions, therefore, are proactive, preemptive, and deterrent in nature. The secondary focus of the effort is to increase probabilities of receiving First Responder Grant Program money during FY03.

HazMat Accident Protection Measures

Recently there has been a lot of media coverage and political discussions regarding the transportation and storage of radioactive waste from nuclear power plants. Most of the concern about moving and storing nuclear waste has been about the tremendous expense of doing so. The costs associated with preparing spent nuclear fuel for shipment, safely and securely transferring it, and building more certified repositories for permanent safe-keeping are absolutely phenomenal. Numerous states and their representatives in the U.S. Congress have elevated this matter to national crisis levels.

For emergency first responders, the urgency is a more a matter of public health and safety. This is simply because of the glaring vulnerabilities involved in the proper disposal of radioactive waste products. The vulnerabilities are particularly escalated along the many truck and rail routes used to transport these extremely hazardous materials. Those fire and emergency medical services departments along these routes clearly require advanced HazMat skills and response plans that extensively address best procedures.

Truck and rail routes are constantly subject to change; maybe that's a good thing from a terrorism prevention aspect. Nevertheless, emergency response departments nearby existing or probable routes must ensure the identity of each one. Armed with reliable route location information, the CIPIC advises those departments to do some aggressive trouble-shooting. For example, to be prepared for any contingency, first responders should know the following about each truck or rail route: densely populated areas, bridges and tunnels, traffic congestion or choke points, major intersections (including railroads), sharp curves, steep inclines and declines, possible obstacles such as construction, adjacent critical structures, etc. Only with this knowledge can emergency responders actively plan and execute measures to reduce or eliminate the degradation of critical infrastructures caused by an intentional or accidental HazMat incident. It is necessary to add a caution here that all information about route locations and vulnerabilities should be considered very sensitive and advantageous for America's domestic and international adversaries.

Interdependency of Critical Infrastructures

Four concurrent failures resulted in a complete outage of electricity on 29 April at metropolitan Jacksonville, Florida. The director of the area electric authority said two major transmission lines detected a fault and shut down. That was followed by a transformer fire at one generating plant, which caused a generator failure at another plant. The regional computers then automatically shut down the entire electric generating system to prevent it from being damaged.

Running on emergency power, Jacksonville International Airport allowed arriving flights to land, but prohibited departing flights partially because there was no power in the terminal for either ticketing or security. Telephone service, including some cellular service, was adversely affected. Jacksonville's only trauma center resorted to emergency power after a brief outage. There was also a temporary decrease in the city's water supply.

Power company officials said they were prepared to deal with two simultaneous incidents, but not four major ones. Although this incident was localized in one large city, it dramatically illustrates the interdependence of critical infrastructures and the resulting widespread impact that multiple failures could produce anywhere in the United States. It is also appropriate to note here that computers controlling the electric power system around the nation have been probed from the Middle East, said experts at a recent conference on the security of electric systems.

9-1-1 Enhancements

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has adopted new rules designed to enhance the efficient handling and rapid response to calls for emergency assistance made from wireless mobile telephones. Specifically, the FCC addressed issues connected with the inability to call back a 9-1-1 caller who is disconnected when that caller is using a "non-initialized" wireless telephone. So that dispatchers will recognize wireless callers and be alerted that their call cannot be returned, the FCC will require that wireless phones be programmed so that "123-456-7890" shows on the dispatcher's screen.