InfoGram

April 24, 2003

NOTE: This InfoGram will be distributed weekly to provide members of the emergency management and response sector with information concerning the protection of their critical infrastructures. It has been prepared by NATEK Incorporated for the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. For further information, contact the Emergency Management and Response - Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) at (301) 447-1325 or by email at emr-isac@fema.dhs.gov.

Planning for Attacks on Critical Infrastructures

Members of the national transportation sector were recently reminded that terrorists maintain an ongoing interest in attacking American critical infrastructures using trucks, trains, ships, and aircraft transporting hazardous materials (HazMat). Interviews with captured al Qaeda officials revealed that the terrorist network will attempt to locate and employ available transportation systems carrying HazMat to create another catastrophic event within the United States.

Security experts believe that terrorists who seize hazardous cargo will probably attack a lucrative location containing multiple critical infrastructures. The following are just a few examples of probable targets; it is not an inclusive list:

• Major road intersection in a highly populated commercial or industrial center.
• Highly traveled vehicle or railroad bridge or tunnel in a large business district.
• Personnel and/or cargo terminal at a busy metropolitan airport.
• Seaport of strategic significance to the economy according to total cargo tonnage.

The CIPIC encourages local emergency managers as well as the leadership of emergency first responders to review the possible targets within their respective communities. Once it is confirmed that dangerous materials do traverse these sites, then the CIPIC also recommends the development or revision and rehearsal of plans to ensure the comprehensive multi-agency mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery from a deliberate or accidental HazMat transport incident at one or more of the potential targets.

Community leaders should remember that plans will differ because they are based primarily on the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks unique to their specific locality. Additionally, the plans must consider the nature, quantity, and packaging of the hazardous cargo that moves nearby critical infrastructures. Unfortunately, there is no "one-size-fits-all" plan. However, there is at least one planning countermeasure common to most cities: reroute HazMat transporters wherever possible to limit or prevent access to critical infrastructures.

Power Failures Degrade CIP

Early this week an area of one state experienced a power failure of approximately four hours. The CIPIC learned that during the temporary outage, first responders were hampered in their performance of duties because several important equipment assets did not function as expected. Among the things that did not work were emergency power generators, battery back-up systems, radio transmission towers, cellular phone service, water pumping stations, fuel pumps, and highway traffic signals.

The non-availability of many of these resources can obviously jeopardize the safety of citizens. Additionally, most of them are important for the continuous protection of critical infrastructures. According to a local official, it begs the question: "What would have been the impact if these things were non-operational for four days instead of four hours?" He lamented: "Today is when you should test these systems, not when an outage occurs."

The brief event described above should motivate frequent status checks and corrective action as necessary. The CIPIC suggests that municipal leaders, emergency managers, and first responders answer no less than following questions in preparation for future power failures:

• Are all emergency power generators operational?
• Do emergency power generators have a sufficient fuel supply?
• What are the procedures to ensure continual refueling?
• Are the manual or automatic transfer switches functional?
• Are back-up systems operational with fully charged batteries?
• Are spare batteries available at the location of the back-up system?
• What are the alternatives if power generators or batteries don't work?
• What are the sources of fuel and water when pumps fail to operate?

Evacuees Could Disrupt CIP

The 17 April issue of The Los Angeles Times reported that more than 100 chemical plants throughout the United States could each expose millions of people to dangerous concentrations of toxic gas in the event of an accident or terrorist attack. "Residential neighborhoods, child-care centers, schools, amusement parks, hospitals, and convalescent homes all lie within the areas in which people could be killed or injured by the gases," according to industry documents filed with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Despite the industry's voluntary efforts to prevent an accidental or deliberate catastrophe, it is unlikely that their security measures will deter the massive movement of people attempting to escape an unsafe gaseous product release.

Similarly, once residents of a major city or urban area confirm the presence of a biological contaminant resulting from terrorist mayhem, they probably will not remain at home or work. Many emergency planners believe that large numbers of people will flee the area and seek shelter in the hills, farms, and towns of rural America.

It is conceivable that evacuees from the affected metropolitan area could overwhelm the resources and services of rural communities. Their imposing presence may challenge local officials in many respects. While endeavoring to accommodate as many evacuees as possible, local leaders must maintain order and deter chaos to protect their own citizens. Additionally, however, they should guarantee that the effective protection of their critical infrastructures is not disrupted by the temporarily enlarged population.

The CIPIC offers that historical case studies demonstrate how a panicky crowd can disrupt the people, physical entities, and cyber systems on which a community depends. "This is something we must think about and plan for," stated the assistant fire chief and 9-1-1 coordinator of a county located 90 miles from Washington, D.C.

Statewide Template Initiative

The State and Local Officials Senior Advisory Committee (SLSAC) with the cooperation of the Emergency Services, Law Enforcement, and Public Health and Hospitals Senior Advisory Committee (ERSAC) have developed the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council's Statewide Template Initiative (STI) to support implementation of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.

The primary objective of the STI is to assist state, local, and tribal authorities in their development of coordinated and comprehensive homeland security plans, which include the protection of critical infrastructures. STI questions, formulated by leaders of state and local governments and the emergency response community, provide a foundation for the preparation of comprehensive and compatible state, local, and tribal homeland security plans that maximize state and local terrorism prevention and response capabilities.

STI questions (and additional questions posed by state and local officials) will expand and integrate existing homeland security planning to deal with terrorist attacks, no matter how unlikely or catastrophic, as well as all natural disasters and accidental hazards. According to the purpose statement found in the STI: "The resulting plans will bolster everyday protection and response capabilities, and the states' ability to better serve its citizens in today's environment.

The STI can be downloaded from the following Department of Homeland Security website: http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Statewide_Template_Initiative.pdf (PDF, 7.1 Kb, Adobe Acrobat (PDF) Help)