InfoGram 44-07: November 8, 2007

This InfoGram will be distributed weekly to provide members of the Emergency Services Sector with information concerning the protection of their critical infrastructures. For further information, contact the Emergency Management and Response - Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) at (301) 447-1325 or by email at emr-isac@fema.dhs.gov.

Receive InfoGrams and Bulletins by Email

CIP Partnership Model

The frequency of natural disasters continues to increase throughout the United States, while the likelihood of a terrorist attack remains constantly probable. These realities suggest that local or county governments must prepare and rehearse crisis management plans for all hazards. Truly effective disaster management planning will include emergency management, police, fire, emergency medical services, emergency communications, public works, transportation, health, education, and other public sector stakeholders. Quality planning events will also involve representatives from the private sector such as business, industry, communications, chambers of commerce, hospitals, colleges, airports, railroads, the American Red Cross, private associations, and similar groups.

The Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) reviewed the CIP Partnership Model developed at Michigan State University (MSU) to enhance public-private partnerships for joint crisis management within local communities. MSU uses the partnership model "to bring together a community's diverse public and private sector membership to collaborate together on planning for, responding to, and recovering from man-made and natural hazards."

A genuine public-private partnership for disaster management should provide direct and indirect benefits for local critical infrastructure protection and resilience. Therefore, the EMR-ISAC offers the following six-step MSU Partnership Model for the consideration of elected leaders, emergency managers, and the chief officers of the emergency services:

• Identify public and private leaders to co-share leadership.
• Ask leaders to solicit from their networks prospective stakeholders to participate.
• Identify common issues on emergency preparedness for participant collaboration.
• Identify new resources in the community for mitigating critical incidents.
• Determine the challenges that participating organizations encounter.
• Create sustainability in the partnership through a needs assessment, setting goals, and establishing task performance.

For more information about this model, contact Mr. Brit Weber at weberbr@msu.edu or 517-355-2227.

Suspicious Surveillance

During the past four months, several Emergency Services Sector (ESS) departments notified law enforcement officials of suspected surveillance of their stations, personnel, and routine operations. In most cases, the suspicious individuals quickly departed the area when approached by a department member. Those who were stopped and interviewed offered seemingly plausible explanations for their actions and were subsequently released.

Counterterrorism specialists instruct that one of the purposes of adversary surveillance is to learn how first responders speak and act under normal circumstances. This observational learning improves the terrorist's ability to appear, talk, and behave in a more convincing and acceptable manner. Because criminals and terrorists often use official uniforms, identification, and vehicles to facilitate their operations, knowing what to say and how to perform gives the antagonists an advantage that significantly increases their chances of accomplishing an attack.

Considering the reports of suspicious surveillance, the Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) emphasizes the necessity for operations security (OPSEC) regarding the normal and emergency operations of ESS organizations. OPSEC protects the sensitive but unclassified information and activities of ESS departments and agencies that are vulnerable to information collection by America's enemies. Typically, the vulnerable sensitive matters include personnel, equipment, structures, operations, plans, and training.

More information about the practice of OPSEC as it supports critical infrastructure protection (CIP) can be obtained from the Interagency Operations Support Staff (IOSS) website at http://www.ioss.gov. The IOSS can be contacted at ioss@radium.ncnc.mil or at 443-479-4677.

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards

In explaining last week's release of Appendix A of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff stated that, "The publication of Appendix A is a critical piece of the federal effort to increase security at high-risk facilities, making it less likely that terrorists can use dangerous chemicals in attacks."

The appendix contains a list of chemicals that, if possessed by a facility in a specified quantity, trigger a requirement to complete and submit an online consequence assessment tool called a Top-Screen. Using the information gathered through the Top-Screen, DHS will be better able to make a preliminary determination as to whether a facility presents a high level of security risk and, therefore, will be required to comply with the substantive requirements of CFATS. The information is valuable for the Emergency Services Sector (ESS) for planning, operations, and critical infrastructure protection.

To determine the type and quantity of chemicals that will be subject to the preliminary screening process, DHS examined the following three security issues:

1. Release � quantities of toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals that have the potential to create significant adverse consequences for human life or health if intentionally released or detonated.
2. Theft and diversion � chemicals that have the potential, if stolen or diverted, to be used or converted into weapons.
3. Sabotage and contamination � chemicals that, if mixed with other readily available materials, have the potential to create significant adverse consequences for human life or health.

Appendix A lists approximately 300 chemicals of interest and includes common industrial chemicals such as chlorine, propane and anhydrous ammonia as well as specialty chemicals such as arsine and phosphorus trichloride. Facilities that possess chemicals of interest at or above the listed screening threshold quantities are required to complete the Top-Screen within 60 calendar days of the publication of Appendix A.

DHS worked closely with the chemical industry as well as state and local authorities on strengthening security at chemical facilities throughout the country. While many chemical facilities have already initiated voluntary security programs and made significant investments to improve security, gaps remain. The CFATS regulation imposes for the first time comprehensive federal security regulations for high-risk chemical facilities.

The Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center encourages ESS leaders to examine the Appendix A final rule of CFATS at www.dhs.gov/chemicalsecurity, especially for its relevancy to facilities in their jurisdictions and for planning activities such as on-site inspections, mutual aid agreements, and response strategies.

Cold Weather Operations

After an extended period of warm weather, many parts of the U.S. are experiencing abrupt temperature changes, signaling a need for the Emergency Services Sector (ESS) to prepare for the challenges of cold weather operations.

As pointed out in a recent firerescue1.com article, freezing conditions make response operating conditions more hazardous and adversely affect the available water supply. These consequences can potentially degrade an organization's critical infrastructures by endangering personnel, damaging equipment, and disrupting "response-ability." Before the onset of inclement weather is an ideal time to prepare personnel, apparatus, and equipment, and to review cold-weather operating procedures.

Among the article's recommendations are the following lessons learned:

• Establish procedures with jurisdictional stakeholders to assist fire and emergency operations by setting priorities for snow removal at stations, on primary response routes, and at essential areas such as hospitals, nursing homes, and other designated critical sites.
• Plan to work in concert with other emergency agencies to ensure that abandoned vehicles are removed, traffic is controlled during operations, and streets are closed for emergency responses.
• Stock sand or salt at station locations and carry smaller quantities on apparatus along with shovels.
• Carry extra hose, and hydrant and water supply appliances on apparatus to increase operational options in case of delays by other apparatus.
• Test hydrants before use to ensure they are not frozen and drain and replace hose as soon as possible.
• Place water extinguishers inside apparatus to prevent freezing.

All recommendations can be reviewed at http://www.firerescue1.com/fire-attack/articles/317658. Additional considerations, discussed in a cold-weather operations article at Firehouse.com include winter driving hazards, personnel protection, and incident scene hazards. See this article here.

The Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) suggests emergency responders initiate planning and procedures to ensure continuity of operations and mission success during the anticipated adverse weather of winter 2007-2008.