InfoGram 26-09: July 2, 2009

This InfoGram will be distributed weekly to provide members of the Emergency Services Sector with information concerning the protection of their critical infrastructures. For further information, contact the Emergency Management and Response - Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) at (301) 447-1325 or by email at emr-isac@fema.dhs.gov.

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Independence Day Observances

Independence Day observances attract large groups of people at thousands of locations throughout the United States. Unfortunately, Fourth of July activities offer countless opportunities for domestic and transnational terrorists to attack areas that could cause mass casualties and involve high-profile, national security, and critical infrastructure concerns.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) confirmed there are no substantiated threats against this year's holiday revelry. However, DHS recommends consideration of the possibility for terrorism, criminal behavior, vandalism, confrontational tactics, demonstrations, service disruptions, etc. There is little time remaining to prepare community and Emergency Services Sector (ESS) critical infrastructures (i.e., personnel, physical assets, and communication/cyber systems) for civil unrest, criminal violence, or terrorism that might occur during any merriment on the weekend surrounding Independence Day.

The inherent problem for government leaders and emergency responders is the delicate balance between protecting citizens and local critical infrastructures in addition to the civil liberties Americans enjoy because of events that occurred on 4 July 1776. To help reconcile this problem and ensure citizen safety and morale, as well as successful Fourth of July festivities, the Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) provides the following brief reminders from various sources to enhance preparatory measures of ESS departments and agencies:

• Encourage personnel to be alert and immediately report any situation that appears to constitute a threat or suspicious activity.
• Develop provisions to validate the identity of official personnel, guests, and vehicles that may be seen at or near planned gatherings.
• Familiarize with local first responder uniforms and vehicles, including those from mutual aid partners and other adjacent municipalities.
• Establish strict internal accountability for uniforms, accouterments, vehicles, operating devices, codes, and anything else that can be used by adversaries to "legitimize" their presence or to facilitate illicit acts.
• Ascertain if there is any group (violent or non-violent) that plans to appear at local celebrations with or without a formally approved permit.
• Rehearse plans to professionally intercept and remove individuals or groups that unlawfully disrupt proceedings.
• Confirm the readiness of local stakeholders and mutual aid partners to execute emergency response plans if an attack or violence occurs.
• Reinforce the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System.
• Beware of the dangers from fireworks that injured over 7,000 Americans last year. See the FEMA 4th of July release for more information.

Electromagnetic Pulse

The Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) reviewed the “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack” (PDF, 7.2 MB). This report examines the effects of a high altitude EMP attack on the critical infrastructures of the U.S. and offers recommendations to minimize and protect against the damages of such an attack. The high numbers of networked electronics which control, communicate, compute, store, manage, and implement nearly every aspect of American civilian systems make an EMP attack potentially devastating. An EMP would most likely have to originate from the detonation of a nuclear device at a high altitude to produce catastrophic effects. If used in this manner, the pulse (i.e., emitted gamma rays) could cover a large geographic area, producing “widespread and long lasting disruption and damage to the critical infrastructures that underpin the fabric of U.S. society.”

The report provides a detailed overview of critical infrastructure sectors vulnerable to an EMP attack, elaborates on the potential damages and consequences associated with each sector, and makes recommendations for the mitigation of the effects of an EMP attack. The report additionally addresses EMP effects on the commonalities and interdependencies of the following infrastructure sectors: electric power, telecommunications, emergency services, banking and finance, petroleum and natural gas, transportation, agriculture and food, space systems, and government.

From this report, the EMR-ISAC learned that one EMP attack could create a functional collapse of the electrical power grid in the geographical area exposed to the pulse. In an instant, the power grid could be seriously degraded or shut down completely. Because several other services rely on electricity, and since many infrastructures are interconnected, the possibility exists that other grids beyond the exposed area would collapse as well. Depending on the strength of the EMP, the full recovery of the national infrastructure could progress slowly as many replacement parts are manufactured overseas.

The report generally recommends that prevention, protection, and recovery be balanced by “making preparations to manage the effects of an EMP attack, including understanding what has happened, maintaining situational awareness, having plans in place to recover, challenging and exercising those plans, and reducing vulnerabilities.” However, this report specifically suggests the following actions for Emergency Services Sector departments and agencies:

Develop an EMP attack consequence assessment tool to perform planning analysis and training, and to assist in the identification of critical equipment and personnel requirements.

Establish a program to assess the vulnerability of evolving emergency services networks and electronics equipment to EMP, and to develop a model plan for hardness maintenance and surveillance for implementation by state and local jurisdictions.

Communications Unit Leader Training

The Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) learned from the Winter 2009 edition of Emergency Communications Quarterly (PDF, 3.5 MB) that the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) is offering the “All-Hazards Type III Communications Unit Leader (COML) Training and Implementation” course.

The OEC supports and promotes the ability of emergency responders and government officials to communicate in the event of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters. It works to ensure, accelerate, and attain interoperable and operable emergency communications nationwide. OEC is a component of the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) within the Department of Homeland Security. CS&C is responsible for enhancing the security, resiliency, and reliability of the nation's cyber and communications infrastructure.

Although OEC offers the training and materials for free, travel costs are the responsibility of the individual state or local agency. However, Homeland Security Grant Program funds and Interoperability Emergency Communications Grant Program funds, once awarded and programmed as such, may be used for travel, overtime, and backfill expenses related to COML training or the development and administration of credentialing processes.

COML is a position under the Logistics Section of the Incident Command System (ICS) (PDF, 3.8 MB). The course trains emergency responders to be communications unit leaders during all-hazards emergency operations, significantly improving communications across the multiple disciplines and jurisdictions responding to an incident. COML responsibilities include developing plans for the effective use of incident communications equipment and facilities, managing the distribution of communications equipment to incident personnel, and coordinating the installation and testing of communications equipment. Candidates should have an emergency response communications background with exposure to field operations and fundamental emergency response communications technology, supervisory, and personnel management skills. The goal is to have the course offered in each of the 10 FEMA regions every 3 months. For information regarding the COML course or course dates and locations, visit the SAFECOM program website.

New Emergency Communications Governance Guide

“Establishing Governance to Achieve Statewide Communications Interoperability: A Guide for Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan (SCIP)” (PDF, 4.7 MB) was developed by the Office of Emergency Communications and released in December 2008. While reviewing this Guide, the Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) learned that the document should assist states to implement their Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans (SCIP). SCIP are locally-driven, multi-jurisdictional, and multi-disciplinary statewide plans to enhance the interoperability of emergency communications.

Every state and territory has an approved SCIP that addresses designated critical elements for statewide interoperability and a self-identified process to frequently update it. During a periodic SCIP update, this Guide should streamline the process to ensure multi-discipline and multi-jurisdictional coordination at all levels of government. According to the Guide, a coordinated practitioner-driven approach can ensure the comprehensive implementation of communications interoperability strategies outlined within the National Emergency Communication Plan (NECP), each State’s SCIP, and regional and local strategic planning documents.

Additionally, the Guide presents information about the role, system, and operations of statewide governing bodies that are charged with improving communications interoperability across a state. The EMR-ISAC confirmed that the Guide presents a set of recommendations for developing a statewide communications interoperability governance methodology and not a list of requirements.