

**NAVAL AIR STATION-FORT WORTH  
FIRE DEPARTMENT  
GUIDELINES FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS**

EXECUTIVE ANALYSIS OF FIRE SERVICE OPERATIONS  
IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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## **ABSTRACT**

Currently in the United States, the threat of terrorism must be taken seriously. These terrorist incidents are an ominous cloud that hangs over our heads following the unthinkable events that occurred on 9-11. Until that time, The United States had been somewhat isolated from terrorist attacks that other parts of the world have been facing for decades. We as citizens, family members and members of the military must face the sad realization that we are targets of terrorist and their causes.

The problem was that The Naval Air Station (NAS) -Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base (JRB) fire department had some guidelines and procedures in place, but these guidelines and procedures were not as defined and detailed as they could be in preparing to handle a terrorist incident.

The purpose of this action research was to develop guidelines for handling a terrorist incident involving the fire department and their personnel. The research was based on what was available and recommended in the fire service across the nation, what was currently being used by the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department, and to determine what should be included in a procedural guideline for the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department in the event of a terrorist incident. The research was accomplished by reviewing professional publications, journals, department operational procedures, personal interviews, and Applied Research Projects.

Results from the research showed that a number of departments and organizations had good procedures developed; but the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department's procedures were not comprehensive enough to guide them through the complete process of handling a terrorist incident.

Without having comprehensive pre-determined procedures in place to deal with a terrorist incident, the results could be an incomplete, rushed effort to manage what is a critical time for a fire service organization.

The recommendations of this research project included the development of proposed procedural guidelines for dealing with a terrorist incident against the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department and supporting documents that could assist the NAS-Fort Worth fire department and its members.

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## INTRODUCTION

The vast majority of fire departments in the United States could benefit from a more standard and comprehensive set of guidelines to follow when a terrorist incident occurs. Historically speaking, past events have proven that the choices, decisions and actions taken in the first hour by responding units and members will shape the outcome of the whole event (Firehouse Magazine, 2002). Organizations and departments must realize that a large block of time will most likely pass before manpower, equipment and additional experts are even contacted, let alone mobilized by the state and federal agencies. To properly prepare and train first responders, a threat and risk analysis should be developed for that particular location. The lack of good comprehensive guidelines may result in an incomplete and haphazard effort during an extremely stressful time. Despite the emphasis on preparing for terrorist incidents, many fire departments have not updated or re-evaluated their procedures and policies for responding, mitigating, and recovering from terrorist incidents.

The problem is, there are no comprehensive procedures or guidelines for handling terrorist incidents in the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department. Many fire departments, government agencies and branches of the military have good policies and procedures in place for handling terrorist incidents. This researcher feels that if an incident of some magnitude were to occur, the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department would be ill prepared to handle most terrorist scenarios without having predetermined procedures in place. Pre-planning for any incident should include a set plan of action that is easy to follow and is understood by all members of the department.

The purpose of this research project was to develop standardized guidelines for handling terrorist incidents in the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department. These guidelines will include a listing of readily available resources and contacts to assist the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department in the handling of a terrorist incident. This project was completed using action research to answer the following specific questions:

**Question 1.** What procedures are available or recommended by national agencies and associations?

**Question 2.** What current procedural documents presently exist in the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department related to handling terrorist incidents?

**Question 3.** What information should be included in a standardized guideline for handling terrorist incidents in the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department?

## **BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE**

America suffered the first of many tragic terrorist attacks on April 19, 1995 with the bombing of the Alfred E. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 1997). This attack was the result of an individual's attempt to draw attention to his "cause" against the Federal government. This was the first time that an incident of this magnitude had taken place in the United States. The attack on the USS Cole in Yemen was only a harsh reminder that our military personnel deployed throughout the world are also included as viable targets by terrorist organizations. Although the attack did not take place on United States soil, our military troops must use the same vigilance no matter where they may be deployed or stationed. The most devastating attack of terrorism against the United States was that

which took place on September 11, 2001. The loss of life that resulted from the attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center is still being felt by many citizens, family and friends throughout the United States and the world. The use of large aircraft as weapons of mass destruction against pre-set targets also resulted in the total shutdown of our air traffic system for the first time in history. The threat of terrorist activity must be addressed and planned for by any agency that may become a target of terrorist. Recent bombing incidents have shown that there can be a sequence of events carefully timed to inflict further harm on those whose job it is to respond to assist others (FEMA, 1997).

The varied manners in which terrorist attacks may be initiated create many questions as to what exactly must be placed at the top of an agency's priority list. Personnel safety, asset protection and proper training are just a few of the issues that must be addressed prior to an actual incident. The actions of the Fire Chief and all members assigned to specific tasks set the tone and pace for the entire department during the period immediately following the initial terrorist incident. Some departments, even after having experienced some type of terrorist activity, still have not developed comprehensive guidelines and procedures.

By having good written policies developed for a terrorist incident, the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department could more effectively and responsibly meet the needs of the people they have chosen to protect.

The subject matter in the National Fire Academy's Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management course has a direct correlation to this topic. Legal aspects of fire protection, organizational change, strategic planning,

creativity, risk analysis and executive planning courses from the National Fire Academy relate to the subject matter of terrorist incidents and how the fire services in the United States prepare for these types of events. Whether or not the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department is prepared to effectively manage a terrorist incident may possibly influence the long-term outlook and well being of the department.

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The literature review was initiated at the National Fire Academy's Resource Learning Center (LRC) during August 2002. The literature review targeted publications, journals, personal interviews, and textbooks as well as completed applied research papers found in the LRC. Further research was conducted at the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department, 10<sup>th</sup> Air Force HQ in Fort Worth and at the researcher's home.

In reviewing the *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY DOMESTIC TERRORISM CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS PLAN* (2001), several key points were noted that dealt with the pre-planning stages of an organization plan. These steps include:

1. Establishing a structure for a systematic, coordinated and effective national response to threats or acts of terrorism in the United States
2. Defining procedures for the use of Federal resources to augment and support local and State governments; and
3. Encompassing both crisis and consequence management responsibilities, and articulate the coordination relationships between these missions.

The plan outlines whom, what and in most cases, when agencies will do certain tasks and duties before and after terrorist incidents. Several agencies have specific duties and responsibilities under this Plan.

- The Attorney General is responsible for developing and implementing policies
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the lead federal agency for crisis management. The FBI will also be responsible for designating a Federal on-scene commander.
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency will act as the lead agency for consequence management in support of State and Local authorities.
- The Department of Defense will provide military assistance to the lead federal agency with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
- The Department of Energy will provide scientific equipment and personnel.
- The Environmental Protection Agency will also provide equipment and personnel during a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident.
- The Department of Health and Human Services will be the lead agency to plan and prepare for medical emergencies resulting from use of WMD by terrorist.

The plans detailed in the manual are very in depth as to who will be in charge of specific tasks. Many of the timelines are not noted as to when they will occur. This lack of detailed timeframes should be considered in preparing guidelines and procedures.

In the National Fire Academy's Applied Research Project *DOMESTIC TERRORISM AND ITS AFFECTS ON THE FIRE SERVICE* (1999), Wilson outlines many important aspects dealing with specific terrorist incidents scenarios as they pertained to the City of Portland, Oregon. He also identified the need to coordinate

resources from the local community, the military, county agencies and the medical community in order to establish an operations plan that would work for all of the parties involved. Wilson also recommended that local fire agencies and the members of the lead agencies be able to obtain expert information and personnel within the first few hours of a terrorist incident. Further recommendations were to conduct multi-jurisdictional exercises to test the proposed operational plans. The training of first responders on exposure, health issues, treatment and decontamination were also at issue in this document.

In *EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM SELF STUDY* (1997), different types of terrorist attacks are detailed specifically to the safety of first responders and the on-scene personnel. During the review of this document, it was noted that pre-planning all emergency operations to better protect the emergency personnel must be placed at the top of an agencies priority list. Although the publication has very good information on different chemicals, incendiary devices and weapons of mass destruction, it appears to lack specific information on the psychological well being of emergency workers during and after an attack.

Sections of *RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE FIRE SERVICE* (1996) are very detailed as to what Operational Risk Management procedures should be observed to protect the first responder. “Conditions or circumstances can exist in which the proper response is **not** to take action—action that could certainly place the lives of responders in danger.” This statement was very instrumental in helping to provide a clear path in establishing the proper guidelines for this project. The book also has an entry pertaining to the “Acceptance of risk”; this entry uses the requirements of

*NFPA 1500* to suggest that risk management increases the duty of fire officers and Chiefs to provide better health and safety programs during all types of operations for their firefighters.

*Emergency Response to Terrorism Job Aid (2000)* is a very useful “pocketbook” developed by the Department of Justice and FEMA in partnership with the National Fire Academy. The document is divided into five sections; an introduction, operational considerations, incident-specific actions, agency-specific actions and a glossary of terms. The largest section is the incident-specific one. General information in this section is useful for reference, but each department should evaluate their most probable scenarios and gear their procedures and training to those selected issues. The portable, highly durable construction of this document is ideal to emergency responders and should be considered as an additional tool to use by on-scene commanders.

In reviewing *COMBATTING TERRORISM-Issues in Managing Counterterrorism Programs (2000)*, many key points are addressed that Mr. Rabkin feels are vital to an effective response by all agencies involved. Money seems to be an integral part of the report. The report states that federal spending has risen drastically in 2001, to an alarming \$11 billion as detailed in the presidential budget. A proper threat assessment is desired so that the correct strategies, and therefore monetary distribution, may be used by the governmental agencies in charge of finances. The report also calls for a priority listing of all threat assessments. A final thought that surfaces from this report is the fact that exercises at the federal level are not being performed as needed. The FBI did not conduct or participate in a field exercise covering the aspects of crisis and

consequence management for a major terrorist incident in the three years following the introduction of Presidential Decision Directive 39 in 1995.

*NAS JRB Fort Worth Disaster Preparedness Plan- NASJRBFORTWINST 3440.1* (1997) is currently under revision. This operating instruction deals with all concepts of operation and responses to all types of disasters, including terrorist incidents, by the fire department in conjunction with the other entities on the base. In the document, a detail on what organization and/or individual(s) will be directly responsible for specific actions is shown. Many sections of the instruction are for base-wide operations involving public affairs, emergency communication, logistics etc. Detailed fire department actions for terrorist incidents are almost non-existent. A positive aspect of the instruction is that the Fire Chief is designated as the Disaster Preparedness Officer. This position will allow him or his representative to better assess and handle terrorist incidents with the complete understanding of his fire teams abilities and limitations. The command center is also a bright spot as it is located **INSIDE** the fire station. The familiarity and knowledge of communication equipment and reference material is immeasurable. A very detailed list of specific offices and organizations assigned to the disaster response team is vitally important, and this document has that. Appendix 3 is a seven-page attachment to the actual instruction titled *Response To Terrorist Incidents Involving WMD*. This appendix is an excellent start to what should be built for all terrorist incidents. One section in the document relates to another document that is being established at this time. The new document will most likely deal more specifically with terrorist planning. It has been tentatively named *NASJRBFORTWINST 5530.3-Antiterrorism Plan*.

## PROCEDURES

### **Research Methodology**

The desired results of this research are to develop a better-organized and uniform set of guidelines for handling terrorist incidents in the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department. Using action research, supported by descriptive research, procedures and guidelines used by other departments and agencies across the nation were identified and reviewed. The research was descriptive in nature due to identifying what is currently available and being used in a number of departments. The information assembled was in the form of professional publications, National Fire Academy applied research papers, professional journals, department operational procedures, and personal interviews.

The research was action research in that the information gathered was used to develop guidelines for use by the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department should it experience a terrorist incident. The guidelines identify the steps that a Fire Chief, or his designee, should implement and follow to better prepare and support the department. The guidelines, as well as an emergency contact form developed from this research, are shown in Appendix A and Appendix B.

### **Limitations and Assumptions**

It is assumed that all fire departments, including the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department, strive to have the very best information available to better handle any type of terrorist incident or attack. It is also assumed that every firefighter accepts the fact that the distinct possibility exists for these terrorist incidents within their own

department. The additional assumption is that the research done by others was as accurate as possible. Limitations of this research project include the lack of historical background data due to the limited number of documented terrorist incidents that have been perpetrated against firefighters in the United States and at NAS- Fort Worth JRB.

### **Definition of Terms**

**Terrorism:** The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives.”

**Crisis Management:** The Federal Government defines crisis management as “predominately a law enforcement function and includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.”

**Consequence Management:** The Federal Government defines Consequence Management as “predominantly an emergency management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.”

**Weapons of Mass Destruction:** 1. ) Any explosive, incendiary, poison gas, bomb, grenade, or rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, or mine or device similar to the above. 2.) Poison gas. 3.) Any weapon involving a disease organism. 4.) Any weapon designed to release radiation at a level dangerous to human life.

## RESULTS

The research for this project involved examining a wide variety of different guidelines and publications dealing with preparing, responding to and recovering from terrorist incidents. The review of the available documents and procedures used by the NAS-Fort Worth JRB fire department for handling terrorist incidents was also accomplished. The proposed procedures and supporting documents were established after careful examination of what this researcher felt was the best available options. The results are found in:

**Appendix A** NAS-Fort Worth JRB Guidelines for Terrorist Incidents

**Appendix B** Emergency Contact Information

### **Answers to Research Questions**

**Research Question 1.** This researcher was unable to find a universal fire department procedure for handling terrorist incidents. Many agencies and organizations had recommended procedures, guidelines and SOP's that were reviewed; FEMA, the Department of Justice, the National Fire Academy, but most were specific to a department or were vague and deliberately generic.

Universally, the information reviewed suggested the need to develop a plan tailored to each fire department before an incident of this nature occurs. There is not sufficient time to create procedures or guidelines when a terrorist incident actually occurs. It is critical that those emergency responders understand the threats and know proper response procedures and the limits of safe and prudent response. This knowledge will help prevent further fatalities (FEMA, 1997).

During the research portion of this project, several comprehensive documents and guidelines were found that helped to determine what was considered by this author to be the best options for the NAS Fort Worth JRB fire department.

Many very good ideas and concepts were discovered in looking at FEMA's *RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE FIRE SERVICE*, the *Emergency Response to Terrorism Job Aid*, a joint publication of the United States Department of Justice and FEMA and the National Fire Academy, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY DOMESTIC TERRORISM CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS PLAN* and the United States General Accounting Office's *COMBATTING TERRORISM-Issues in Managing Counterterrorist programs*. The constant factor found in each of these resources is the attention to detail, starting with the initial on-scene actions and concluding with the return to normal operations well after the terrorist incident. Many of these documents send a clear message that training; threat assessment and actual field exercises must be accomplished in order to better prepare fire department personnel to understand the joint operations that will arise from most terrorist incidents. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the United States Fire Administration in *RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE FIRE SERVICE*, (1996), all departments must have a plan in place that has been reviewed and evaluated by all members and entities involved. The need for practical exercises also plays a large part in the effective risk management that will be encountered at a terrorist incident. In conclusion, practice makes perfect, to a certain degree. Another important point that is addressed in the document is that all incident action plans be shared and reviewed by

ALL personnel in the management chain of command with particular attention paid to evaluating what is an acceptable risk.

Some of the hurdles and roadblocks that have arisen in the fight against terrorist incidents have been largely dealing with acquiring and using resources. Many agencies appear to try to start their own “wish list” or specific agency driven needs without contacting or coordinating with those agencies that will most likely share a response. This is identified by the statement, “...creating the potential for agencies to develop their own programs without adequate coordination, leaving the potential for gaps and/or duplication.” (GAO, 2000).

Many of the publications and reports covering terrorist incidents have been used to create basic response and initial attack procedures for a large majority of fire departments. These documents, operating instructions, action plans etc. are usually department specific. Many of these are good up to the period of hours following the actual incident, but are not geared to the long time frame of days to weeks that many terrorist incidents may become. Reference numbers and agencies to contact for specific needs are also somewhat lacking.

**Research Question 2.** What documents presently exist in the NAS-Fort Worth JRB Fire Department related to handling terrorist incidents?

At the time of this research, it was found that the guidelines and procedures for handling terrorist incidents were alarmingly limited. *Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth Instruction 3440.1 (2002)* did not have an exclusive operation instruction for dealing with terrorist incidents. There is a sub-section of this document that addresses terrorist incidents, but tends to guide the reader back to other sections of

the operating instruction for more specific directions. A revision of this document is being prepared at this time; the final draft should be available near the end of February 2003. The firefighters currently use this document to provide direction for the initial response, and then what typically happens is that they treat each separate part of the terrorist attack as a totally different incident. It was discovered that after the attacks of September 11, 2001, better communications and planning began to take place at NAS Fort Worth JRB. Chief Robert Greer has been the Fire Chief at this location since 1997. He feels that the base is finally headed in the right direction to put together a proper terrorist action and response plan (R. Greer, personal communication, Dec 12, 2002). Chief Greer was able to provide some background on a few difficulties that he has faced in trying to establish better plans of action at the base. In the late 90's, Carswell Air Force Base was de-commissioned by the United States Congress under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list. At that time, the facility was turned over to the United States Navy as the new landlord and renamed NAS Fort Worth JRB, Carswell Field. The concept of the new base was that many different branches of the military would work together to use the base more efficiently. While good in concept, the actuality was that these branches were not used to working with so many other agencies at one location. It appears that there were many turf wars and difference of opinions. This caused any action plans by Chief Greer and his department to be delayed or drawn out more than was desired. He now feels that working relationships and the "correct" way of getting things done has been worked out. Chief Greer also provided some insight into what local fire departments and medical establishments would be used in the event of a terrorist attack. The base itself does not have a medical

facility and does not provide an ambulance service. MedStar is the local ambulance service that is contracted through the city of Fort Worth and the base. They have contracted to provide up to forty-four ALS/BLS mobile intensive care units in the event of a major incident or plane crash. Chief Greer also has begun to put together a major incident exercise involving all of the mutual aid companies for the April/May 2003 timeframe. The mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities are also being revised to better coordinate and establish incident command procedures for all communities and military units assigned to the base. The question was asked of Chief Greer by this author, "what do you do if one of your firefighters is seriously injured or killed? How do you go about contacting the next of kin?" Chief Greer stated that the home phone numbers were kept in the alarm center for all shift personnel and that the Incident Commander had the option of requesting the alarm center to make the call or contacting the Navy Chaplain to make the notification in person. Many additional contacts, phone numbers, and steps of action are kept by the NAS Fort Worth JRB fire department's Assistant Chief of Training, Mr. Steve Thrall (S. Thrall, personal communication, Nov 23, 2002). Chief Thrall has been the NAS Fort Worth JRB fire department's training chief from September of 2001 to the present. This additional information is kept on Chief Thrall's office computer and found in various files throughout his office. In all probability, these checklists and additional information would not be readily available or easily found by anyone other than Chief Thrall. The delay that could result from an inability to find some of these particular numbers or contacts could result in a less effective operation at a stressful time. Chief Thrall was also able to provide information on the level of medical and hazardous material

certifications and abilities of the assigned firefighters. Only twelve of fifty-five firefighters have any medical skills above basic first aid. Hazardous materials' training is a bright spot. A vast majority of the firefighters has operations or technician level training. The fire department also has a hazardous materials trailer with sufficient supplies and suits to handle many spills or terrorist initiated incidents. The City of Fort Worth fire department has worked with the base on many different levels of response and both Chief Greer and Chief Thrall feel very confident that if a terrorist incident were to occur, Fort Worth would send as many resources and trained personnel as they possibly could.

**Research Question 3.** What information should be included in a standardized guideline for handling Terrorist incidents at the NAS Fort Worth JRB fire department?

After reviewing *EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM SELF STUDY* (1997), *COMBATTING TERRORISM-Issues in Managing Counterterrorism Programs* (2000), the *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY DOMESTIC TERRORISM CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS PLAN* (2001), the *Emergency Response to Terrorism Job Aid* (2000) and *RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE FIRE SERVICE* (1996), it was determined that several critical steps need to be included in a standardized guideline for handling terrorist incidents at NAS Fort Worth JRB by the fire department. It was also noted that the use of an emergency notification form might prove to be a valuable asset in the case of an injured or dead firefighter. The proposed documents and guidelines in this paper are: Appendix A- NAS Fort Worth JRB Terrorist Incident Guidelines and Appendix B- Emergency Notification Information.

Appendix A should include instructions for taking immediate action to protect the assets of the base and its personnel. Aircraft and munitions are top priority and will most likely be targeted very early on in most terrorist incidents. An initial risk assessment and target analysis should be done by all parties responsible for building and reviewing any action plan or procedural documents. "The critical first step in a sound threat and risk assessment process is the threat analysis." (GAO, 2000, p.4). WMD training is vital to all first responders. The ability to recognize a possible WMD attack is part of the initial size up of the On-scene Commander. Terrorists can and will look for ways to disrupt, disable and eliminate first responders. The inclusion of initial size up responsibilities is one of the critical steps that should be included in this guideline. The incident command system should be included in the guidelines. Luckily, most fire departments, military branches and government agencies have adopted some form of the incident command system, as we know it today. A command center should be designated and stocked ahead of time so that there is no delay when an incident calls for its use.

Due to the lack of medical facilities on the base, establishing an emergency medical sector and commander as soon as there is a need for medical assistance is another critical step that should be included. A list of readily available BLS/ALS units and their approximate response time would be beneficial to the incident commander.

The protection of firefighters and other first responders should be the concern of ALL the members of the unified command, joint operations center, incident commanders, and on scene personnel. If firefighters are not made aware of dangerous conditions, known threats or possible WMD problems, they may be disabled, injured or

killed. Inclusion of personnel checks, team checks, or some form of accountability system should be used. The establishment of a triage area, or areas if the incident calls for it, should happen early also. Rehab areas should also be considered. Due to the possible long duration of terrorist incidents, rest and replacement of all first responders will be vital. Scene control must be established with the help of military police and the local law enforcement community. The on scene commander should make the scene safe by using all available sources so that injury, scene contamination and the loss of physical evidence is observed. Secondary devices are a distinct possibility and should be considered when determining if a scene is safe or not. Bruno speaks of this, "For example, there may be a delayed, secondary explosive device-a common pattern in many in many overseas incidents-that is intended to kill emergency personnel after they arrive on the scene." (Firehouse Magazine, July 1995, p.10).

A proper step to elevate the response and call in subject matter specialists is another critical element of this document. Delays in asking for help can never be made up. Phone numbers and contact personnel should be readily available to the command center personnel. Additional inputs and checks are included in the guidelines that should provide more help.

Appendix B should contain emergency contact information for all firefighters. This form should also have names, addresses, and secondary phone numbers, pagers etc. Additionally, pertinent information on religious preference may be included. Children's names and ages are also included. This form should be updated annually or when a change occurs. The information should be designated as "for official department business", to provide for better confidentiality. The information forms should

be sealed and kept in a secure location that is accessible to the individual(s) responsible for the notifications. Notification of next of kin should occur as soon as possible. The chance of hearing bad news on television or the radio is not the proper way to take care of our firefighters and their families

## **DISCUSSION**

A proposed guide was developed and can be found in Appendix A. The document is made up of important items that should not be overlooked in the event of a terrorist incident. Regardless of the nature of the event a community faces, the initial response by community leaders and responders will be critical in determining the eventual outcome of the incident (Creamer, 2002).

An emergency contact information form was also developed and can be found in Appendix B. Although very basic, this form may be invaluable to the fellow firefighters who must notify the family of their injured or dead comrades. "It is too late to start planning when the alarm bell rings" (National Fire Protection Association, 1993).

It was determined by this research project that even though a large amount of generic documentation regarding the handling of terrorist incidents was found, any guidelines or procedures used should be streamlined to fit the needs and resources of each individual fire department. Departments must be reminded that a lack of these procedures may result in an incomplete and flawed effort during an extremely critical time.

The final arrangement and layout of the supporting documents was determined by actually using several different guides in a simulated exercise by this researcher at

his home. Comparing what is currently available and being used by the NAS Fort Worth JRB fire department to the items in Appendix A and Appendix B; this researcher feels that too many items and tasks may be neglected or overlooked if the NAS Fort Worth JRB fire department continues to use what they currently have in place.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Departmental procedures for handling terrorist incidents should include the documents: NAS Fort Worth JRB Terrorist Incident Guidelines (Appendix A) and the Emergency Notification Information Form (Appendix B). These should assist the NAS Fort Worth JRB fire department in the event of a terrorist incident and the possible serious injury or line-of-duty death resulting from that incident.

The guideline established for handling terrorist incidents is only a proposal. Placing this type document into action is something that should be seriously considered to better prepare firefighters for the unthinkable occurrence of terrorist attacks.

The completed Emergency Notification Information Form must be immediately accessible to any person who may be involved in an injury or line-of-duty death notification. The additional numbers for work phones, cell phones, and pagers of individuals to be notified in case of emergencies should be continuously reviewed and updated. While the procedures developed are written specifically for the NAS Fort Worth JRB fire department, these documents can also be an excellent resource for any paramilitary organization. Any public safety agency could use these procedures as a reference, should they experience a serious injury or line-of-duty death.

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## Appendix A

### Naval Air Station Fort Worth JRB Terrorist Incident Guidelines

#### Scope of Use

The guidelines established in this document are for the use of all first responders, incident commanders, mutual aid companies and federal agencies. The guidelines are for a terrorist incident at Naval Air Station Fort Worth JRB or involving terrorist attacks against assets assigned to the base itself. These guidelines have been written with the fire department in mind; but may be used by anyone involved.

The incident Command System will be used to provide better command and control functions at terrorist incidents. Specific tactics and strategies will still be at the discretion of the on scene commanders.

Due to security issues, mutual aid companies and outside agencies responding onto the base will be escorted from the front gate to the scene by military law enforcement personnel.

#### Section 1 Initial Response

- 1.1 Alarm center personnel will relay to all responding units any information or indications that a possible terrorist incident or attack has occurred.
- 1.2 If the incident appears to be terrorist related, immediate law enforcement response should be requested.
- 1.3 Alarm center personnel should relay wind direction and speed to all responding units in the event of a possible chemical or radiation release and/or attack.
- 1.4 Safe response routes should be noted in all pre-fire plans and used accordingly.
- 1.5 If the possibility exists of terrorist attacks, the Assistant Chief of Operations will alert all responding units to the possibility of explosive devices, secondary devices and unexploded ordinance.

## **Section 2 On Scene Size Up**

- 2.1 The first arriving unit shall provide an initial size up to include; nature of emergency, the presence or absence of actual fire, extent of the damage and as to whether there are any known victims or injuries.
- 2.2 The first arriving unit will also confirm or change the safe route in.
- 2.3 The Assistant Chief of Operations shall assume command upon his arrival. He will also provide a secondary size up at this time.
- 2.4 After his arrival and size up, the Assistant Chief of Operations will establish the Incident Command Post, an entry control point (ECP), and the location of all staging areas as needed.
- 2.5 The Assistant Chief of Operations will assign a fire department representative to man the ECP. Law Enforcement will respond to the ECP to maintain scene security.
- 2.6 The rescue team will provide the Assistant Chief of Operations with as much information as possible as to the level of medical response needed.

## **Section 3 Operational Responsibilities**

- 3.1 The Assistant Chief of Operations, or his designated on scene commander, should initiate the Incident Command System as soon as possible.
- 3.2 An Incident Safety Officer will be assigned to each separate incident.
- 3.3 Establish emergency egress routes
- 3.4 Begin personnel accountability procedures; establish time marks to perform follow up checks.
- 3.5 Determine the need for mutual aid
- 3.6 If possible HAZMAT or WMD incident, establish a hot, warm and cold zone with an ECP upwind and uphill if feasible.
- 3.7 Bioenvironmental should be requested to monitor entry and exit from the scene if HAZMAT or WMD is possible.

- 3.8 Request Fire Department recall as soon as the need has been established.
- 3.9 Determine life safety threats for all responders and victims.
- 3.10 Identify stability of damaged buildings, aircraft and munitions involved.
- 3.11 Set up an initial triage area for injured personnel and victims.

#### **Section 4 Command Center**

- 4.1 The Command Center should be opened as soon as the need arises.
- 4.2 The location of the primary command center is the base fire station, building #1425.
- 4.3 The secondary command center will be located at the 301<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing Command Post located in building #1654.
- 4.4 Law Enforcement at the front gate will be notified upon the activation of the Command Center.
- 4.5 The Alarm Center will provide telephones and portable radios to Command Center personnel as they arrive.
- 4.6 The Command Center (or (JOC) Joint Operations Center) will include the following personnel:
  - a. Disaster Preparedness Officer (DPO)
  - b. Fire Chief
  - c. Executive Officer (XO)
  - d. Law Enforcement
  - e. Medical/Bioenvironmental
  - f. Public Affairs
  - g. Services
  - h. Transportation
  - i. Public Works
  - j. Supply

Others may be added as requested by the DPO.

**Section 5    Medical**

- 5.1    The Navy Clinic will be responsible for Medical Control at all Incidents.
- 5.2    The Medical Officer of the Day (MOD) will go to the Command Center. A rapid response team will be sent to the scene.
- 5.3    The rapid response team will set up and monitor the TRIAGE area.
- 5.4    The MOD will contact the area hospitals and MedStar ambulance to place them on alert status.
- 5.5    The following area hospitals and ambulance services have reached agreement with the Naval Air Station to provide emergency treatment following terrorist and/or mass casualty incidents. A note on what areas they will cover is added.
  - a.    MedStar Ambulance-fleet of 44 ambulances
  - b.    CareFlight Helicopter Ambulance-flights from Ft Worth, Denton, Dallas
  - c.    Baylor All Saints Hospital, Fort Worth, Texas-decon, trauma from Mass Casualty Incident
  - d.    Harris Methodist Hospital, Fort Worth, Texas-decon, trauma, medical
  - e.    John Peter Smith Hospital, Fort Worth, Texas-decon, trauma, medical
  - f.    Cook Children's Hospital, Fort Worth, Texas- (under 13 years of age) Decon, trauma, medical
  - g.    Medical Center of Arlington, Arlington, Texas- decon, trauma, medical
  - h.    Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital, Fort Worth, Texas- decon, medical
  - i.    Parkland Memorial Hospital, Dallas, Texas- Burn Unit
  - j.    Methodist Hospital, Dallas, Texas- reconstructive surgery (amputations)

**Section 6 Decontamination (DECON)**

- 6.1 Determine the need for DECON as soon as possible.
- 6.2 Contact Bioenvironmental to monitor the DECON area
- 6.3 The Alarm Center should contact Fort Worth Fire Department's HazMat coordinator to place them on standby.
- 6.4 If the need for mass DECON is required the following should be accomplished;
  - a. Respond the water tanker from the fire station for immediate water supply.
  - b. Respond the HazMat supply trailer from the fire station to the DECON area.
  - c. Contact the supply representative in the command center to bring additional HazMat suits, military issue uniforms, tents, blankets, fans, portable changing stations to the DECON area as needed.

**Section 7 Mortuary Services/Mass Casualty**

- 7.1 Mortuary services will be notified In the event of mass casualties exceeding ten victims and a Mortuary Services/Casualty branch established
- 7.2 A casualty response team will be set up with the following personnel;
  - a. Tarrant County medical Examiner and/or his representative.
  - b. Navy Chaplain, Air Force Reserve Chaplain, Marine Chaplain and staff
  - c. Services
  - d. Public Affairs
  - e. Law Enforcement
  - f. Legal
  - g. Supply
  - h. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
- 7.3 Services will provide a refrigerated truck as needed.
- 7.4 Supply will provide body bags and tents as needed.
- 7.5 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will be responsible for the investigation and collection of evidence. The FBI will also be responsible for the release of bodies and remains to the families.

**Section 8 Critical Incident Stress Management**

- 8.1 Any death or major incident may trigger the need for Critical Incident Stress Management for firefighters and first responders.
- 8.2 The Naval Air Station Critical Incident Stress Management team should be notified at the first sign of emotional distress by any one involved.
- 8.3 The CISM team shall be placed under the control of the Chaplains on scene.
- 8.4 All members will be required to attend debriefings and defusings as a result of the incident.

## Appendix B

### EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION INFORMATION

Information provided on this form will only be used for official department business. Please complete the requested information as completely and accurately as possible. Anytime the information requires updating, a new form should be used. Please attach a map if your contact personnel reside in rural locations that may be hard to find.

#### Personal Information

LAST NAME \_\_\_\_\_ FIRST NAME \_\_\_\_\_ MIDDLE NAME \_\_\_\_\_

HOME ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_ STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

DAYTIME PHONE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_ EVENING PHONE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

#### Contact Information

Identify any family or friend/s that you would like the department to notify in the event you are seriously injured or killed. List your contacts in the order you would like them contacted. If any of your contacts are minor children, identify the adult who should be contacted.

1)

NAME _____	RELATIONSHIP _____
ADDRESS _____	PHONE _____
NAME OF EMPLOYER _____	WORK PHONE _____
WORK ADDRESS _____	PAGER _____ CELL PHONE _____

2)

NAME _____	RELATIONSHIP _____
ADDRESS _____	PHONE _____
NAME OF EMPLOYER _____	WORK PHONE _____
WORK ADDRESS _____	PAGER _____ CELL PHONE _____

3) NAME (S) AND DATE (S) OF BIRTH OF ALL CHILDREN

Name \_\_\_\_\_ DOB \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_ DOB \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_ DOB \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_ DOB \_\_\_\_\_

4) Identify any personnel you would like to accompany a senior staff officer to notify your family in the event of a serious injury or death.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ Phone Number \_\_\_\_\_

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ Phone Number \_\_\_\_\_

5) Religious Preference: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Place of Worship: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Minister/Priest/Clergy: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Phone Numbers: \_\_\_\_\_ Cell \_\_\_\_\_ Pager \_\_\_\_\_

	<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>
Are you a United States Military Veteran?	_____	_____
Are you entitled to a military funeral?	_____	_____
If yes, do you wish to have one?	_____	_____
Do you wish to have a fire service funeral?	_____	_____
Do you have a will?	_____	_____
If yes, where is it on file?	_____	_____
Do you have an executor to contact?	_____	_____

List any memberships you hold in fire service organizations, military organizations, religious or community groups:

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_
6. \_\_\_\_\_

Date Submitted: \_\_\_\_\_

Received By: \_\_\_\_\_