Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management

National Guard Incident Management:

Two System Dilemma

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February 2006
CERTIFICATION STATEMENT

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of
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Abstract

The problem was that National Guard units were governed by Federal, State and Department of Defense requirements regarding Incident Management. The differences in Incident Management Systems could lead to in-efficient coordination between governmental agencies during emergency responses. The purpose of this research was to identify Federal, State and Department of Defense requirements in Incident Management that impacted the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base. Descriptive research answered the questions: (a) what Federal requirements impact the Base, (b) what Department of Defense requirements impact the Base, and (c) what State of Michigan requirements impact the Base? Procedures used to complete this project included interviews and literature reviews. This research’s recommendations suggest introductory level training in NIMS for National Guard organizations.
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Introduction

National Guard Incident Management: Two System Dilemma

The events of 9/11 prompted an unprecedented expansion of emergency management coordination in this country. The Incident Command System (ICS) was in use in many emergency response organizations across the country. President George Bush sought to integrate the emergency response of the entire nation into a single system that would be used in all major events. President Bush issued *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5* (2003) initiating a National Incident Management System (NIMS) that all emergency response organization would use in large scale events. The ICS was well known to the fire service and other emergency response organizations. It became the backbone of the NIMS. Through the Department of Homeland Security, all federal, state, local and tribal organizations were required to adopt the NIMS, except the Department of Defense (National Incident Management System, 2004).

The National Guard played a significant role in Department of Defense (DOD) operations and were a key asset to state Governors in the times of major accidents, natural disasters or terrorist events. National Guard units could be activated in federal status by the President of the United States or in a state status by their perspective Governor (Department of Defense Directive Number 3025.1, 1993). When activated by the Department of Defense, National Guard units were under the command of the Secretary of Defense. When activated in a state activation, the State Governor was the Commander in Chief of the units (National Guard Regulation 500-1/Air National Guard Instruction 10-8101, 1996).
The Department of Defense Incident Management system was unique to military operations and was significantly different from what was being pushed on to the States. In the State of Michigan, the Governor directed the implementation of the NIMS and the ICS to be used by all state and local agencies. The Michigan National Guard could be considered a state agency as well as a federal agency (National Guard Regulation 500-1/Air National Guard Instruction 10-8101, 1996).

The problem was that the Battle Creek Air National Guard (BCANG) was governed by Federal, State and Department of Defense agencies that had different requirements for Incident Management Systems. The BCANG had not identified the implications of the NIMS on the command system that was in use, which may cause inefficiencies in providing support services within the scope of the National Response Plan (2004). While the National Guard did use a Liaison Officer to coordinate functions at a state level, activities conducted on a local level could be affected by different management systems. Local incidents requiring mutual aid assistance could be initiated. The local military organizations and civilian organizations would be working together without that benefit of a Liaison Officer.

The purpose of this research was to identify the Federal, State and Department of Defense requirements in Incident Management for the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base. This research also makes a recommendation for training activities that would enhance emergency response even when military and civilian agencies use differing Incident Management Systems. The recommendation elements provide a beginning point for the BCANG to become familiar with NIMS in preparation for Department of Defense changes to its emergency response system.
The methodology for this research was descriptive. A descriptive approach was taken by conducting a literature review of documents that provided guidance to National Guard involvement in Civil Support to state and local communities. A review of the Incident Management criteria used by the federal government, Department of Defense, and state governments was conducted. This approach was taken to identify existing conditions that may impede fluent operations in emergency management during an incident.

This first question in the study was; what Federal requirements impacted on incident management systems in relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base? The National Guard complies with all Federal Guidelines through the Department of Defense or the State of Michigan. A review of Federal requirements here provided insight into the root cause of two different management systems impacting the National Guard. A review of the National Guard activation criteria was conducted to evaluate the different requirements that may have an effect.

Since *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (2003)* and the *National Response Plan (2004)* exempted the military form adopting the NIMS, the military system must have been unique from that of the plan. The Federal requirements placed on the Department of Defense are passed through several levels of command before reaching the National Guard units. National Guard units must be capable of meeting the expectations of the major commands at each level. This produced the second question of this research; what Department of Defense requirements impacted on Incident Management Systems in relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard. It was at this level that the military system of emergency management began to take shape. A review
of the Incident Management System being used and the activation process from a military perspective was conducted.

Finally, the National Response Plan (2004) required all states to adopt the NIMS in its operations during emergency events. Since the National Guard could be activated as a state emergency response element under the control of the governor, a research of state level requirements seemed in order. The third question of this research explored this area; What State of Michigan requirements impacted on Incident Management in relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base?

Background and Significance

The Battle Creek Air National Guard (BCANG) Base provided emergency services on the installation and to the W. K. Kellogg Airport located in Battle Creek, Michigan. The services primarily were Fire Protection, Emergency Medical Service and Security. The BCANG was fully equipped to provide response to any event that could occur within the installation. Finally, BCANG had responsibility for the entire Southwest Michigan area for any military aircraft incident that should occur. Responses to areas outside of the installation were in coordination with local officials and agencies. These responses were at the request of the local communities rather than through a declared disaster by the President of the United States or the Governor of the State of Michigan. All of the responses potentially involved the coordination and cooperation of the BCANG initial response elements and the local emergency services organizations. However, the command and control structures of military and civilian emergency response organizations appeared to be different.
“The Air Force uses NFPA 1561, *Fire Department Incident Management System* (2005), and the National Fire Academy’s Incident Command System, as modified by AFMAN 32-4004, *Contingency Response Operations*” (Air Force Instruction 32-2001, 1999). The BCANG Fire Department had established standard operating procedures and a training program to comply with the requirements. At that time, the Incident Command System was the primary management system in place and was fairly uniform across the country. The modifications that were implemented by the Air Force included the establishment of a Disaster Control Group (DCG) that primarily handled the functions of planning, logistics and finance for long term operations. This took the function out of the hands of the Incident Commander. The military rank structure was not compatible with enlisted personnel in the Incident Commander position making decisions that primarily fall under the responsibility of Commissioned Officers. A liaison between the Incident Commander and the DCG was the On-Scene Commander. The DCG, however, was required to; and did support the Incident Commander.

The Air Force and Air National Guard structure above the Incident Commander included an On-Scene Commander, Disaster Control Group and Battle Staff. All three functions could be assembled on the installation for emergency response. The Battle Staff had contact with organizations outside installation located at Headquarters offices in Washington, DC and Lansing, MI. The Disaster Control Group could plan local operations and access local resources very quickly. The On-Scene Commander was generally a Commissioned Officer who coordinated the needs of the Incident Commander with the Disaster Control Group. At the State of Michigan Headquarters in
Lansing was a military liaison officer who coordinated military responses with the State Emergency Operations Center.

This command structure provided efficient operations for military activities and had been in place for many years. This system also met the requirements of the National Fire Protection Standards as the standards only required that a system be in place to manage incidents. The Battle Creek Air National Guard Base and specifically the Fire Department was in compliance with the requirements. Despite the modification made by Air Force Regulations, a system was being used.

The President of the United States issued *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5* (2003), directing the Director of Homeland Security to establish a National Response Plan that included a National Incident Management System (NIMS) that would ensure effective disaster operations throughout the country. Upon completion of these documents, Federal, State and Local agencies were required to comply. The development of the *National Incident Management System* (2004) left the Incident Command System already in use by many agencies in tact. Those organizations that were not already using it would have to comply by the year 2005 or risk losing federal grant money to support their operations. The Department of Defense was encouraged to coordinate activity with the NIMS, however, federal grant money was not available to this agency even if they did comply.

Civilian organizations had also been working with the Incident Command System for many years. The general structure of the system included the Incident Commander and a State, County or Local Emergency Operations Center. The Incident Commander had the logistics, planning and finance sections as staff functions. The linear progression
was from the Incident Commander to the County or Local Emergency Operations Center and finally up to the State Emergency Operations Center.

Civilian organizations did not always contact the State Emergency Operations Center for military support. Not all information flowed completely up and down the command and control chain. Many organizations had mutual aid agreements that allowed for a faster response for assistance. Fire Protection and Security were the most prolific at establishing pacts. This forced a basic need for those organizations to be familiar with the Incident Command Systems and Incident Management Systems that would be used by agencies that they may be assisting, which was the National Incident Management System.

The *National Response Plan* (2004) required that all States and Local emergency service organizations become NIMS compliant by October of 2005. The Air National Guard had both a federal and state mission. Under Presidential activation, the Air National Guard performed activities at the direction of the President through the Department of Defense. However, under State activation, the Air National Guard performed activities at the direction of the Governor through the Adjutant General of the State. The State of Michigan was mandated to use the NIMS system in its operation. The dilemma was which system the Air National Guard would be obligated to adopt and work with during a state activation.

*Significance of Study and Linkage*

This research project is related to the National Fire Academy’s (NFA) Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management program because it evaluated a single organization that may have to utilize two different Incident
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Management Systems depending on the type of activation orders that were invoked. This could lead to an inefficient operation during disaster recovery operations between military and non-military organizations. The inefficient operations between these organizations could reduce the level of service to the public, thereby increasing the risk.

This research project related to the five operational objectives of the United States Fire Administration’s (Executive Development R123, 2003, p. 3). In this document, objectives 1 and 2 focus on reducing the loss of life from fire in the age group 14 years old and below, and reduce the loss of life from fire in the age group 65 years old and above. An effective and efficient operation among emergency response organizations is the key to the quick mitigation of any event. Large scale events that lead to the activation of Emergency Operating Centers and military support to civil authorities affect many age groups.

Objective 3. “Reduce the loss of life from fire of firefighters” (Executive Development R123, 2003, p. 3). Coordinated efforts during emergency response and disaster recovery include an accountability aspect for responders and resources. The ability to establish effective command and control of assets reduces the risk taken during recovery operations.

Objective 4. “To promote within communities a comprehensive, multi-hazard risk-reduction plan led by the fire service organization” (Executive Development R123, 2003, p. 3). The Federal Government had established the *National Response Plan* (2004) and the *National Incident Management System* (2004) as the primary multi-hazard risk-reduction plan. Effective coordination and adoption of these plans by military organization will enhance the intent of this effort.
Objective 5. “To respond appropriately in a timely manner to emerging issues” (Executive Development R123, 2003, p. 4). The implementation of the National Response Plan (2004) and National Incident Management System (2004) was certainly an emerging issue in emergency organizations. The military is slow to produce guidance to the field in some of these issues. This phenomena is due to careful evaluation to ensure that the new initiative still allows for effective military operations during wartime and it does not over task the agencies with mandates that are a part of it’s secondary mission.

I will carry out this research project focusing on a descriptive research method. Data will be collected to answer the research questions: (a) What Federal requirements impact on incident management systems in relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base?, (b) What Department of Defense requirements impact on Incident Management Systems in relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base?, and (c) what State of Michigan requirements impact on Incident Management in relations to Battle Creek Air National Guard Base?

Literature Review

The purpose of this review was to gather and review information relating to the primary research questions. Literature that was specific to the Federal and State requirements for implementing the Incident Command System and the National Incident Management System was located by going to web sites of the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense and State of Michigan and reviewing material available to employees in each respective governmental agency. The Department of Defense, United States Air Force, Air National Guard and personal interviews provided literature relevant to the status of the implementation of the National Incident Management System
at the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base. A review of National Fire Protection
Association standards that were referenced in military documentation was conducted.

Using the Internet, a search of the National Incident Management System provided
additional material that was relevant to this research. By analyzing the existing body of
knowledge from these Federal, State and the Air National Guard Base material relevant
to each research question was found. The data was further used to develop the
discussions and recommendations of this author.

The literature search and review that supported the three research questions also
provided the basic layout of this section. The research questions to be answered by this
literature review utilized a top down approach and were; (a) What Federal requirements
impacted on the Incident Management Systems in relation to the Battle Creek Air
National Guard Base?, (b) What requirements by the Department of Defense impacted
the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base’s Incident Management Systems?, and (c)
What State of Michigan requirements impacted on Incident Management Systems in
relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base? This section will conclude with a
summary of the literature that was reviewed during the research of Incident Management
issues for the National Guard.

**Federal Requirements for the Incident Management Systems**

The literature review for question one in this research: What Federal requirements
impacted on the Incident Management System in relation to the Battle Creek Air National
Guard Base, produce a large amount of documentation in only a few documents.

**National Fire Protection Association Standards**
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) published several documents that the Department of Defense, United States Air Force and Air National Guard directives required to be followed.

National Fire Protection Association Standard 1500, *Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program* (2002) required fire department to use “An incident management system that meets the requirements of NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System . . .” (Para. 8.1.2). Further guidance in this document stated that the incident management system will be used in several situations.

8.1.3 The incident management system shall be utilized at all emergency incidents.

8.1.4 The incident management system shall be applied to drills, exercises, and other situations that involve hazards similar to those encountered at actual emergency incidents and to simulated incidents that are conducted for training and familiarization purposes. (p. 1500-21)

National Fire Protection Association Standard 1561, *Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System* (2005) contained “the minimum requirements for an incident management system to be used by emergency services to manage all emergency incidents” (p. 1651-5). This standard applied to a number of organizations and had a broad based application.
1.3.1 This standard shall apply to organizations and other agencies that provide rescue, fire suppression, emergency medical care, special operations, and law enforcement.

1.3.2 This standard shall apply to other emergency services such as public, military, or private fire departments; fire brigades; and other assisting and cooperating agencies. (p. 1561-5)

This document defined the positions and roles of staff positions within an incident management system. “The Incident Commander shall have overall authority for management of the incident” (p. 6), additional staff positions can be implemented as needed for any incident. These positions were broken down to command staff positions of an Information Officer, Liaison Officer and Incident Safety Officer. General staff positions were identified as Operations section, Planning section, Logistics section and Finance/Administration section. Each section had distinct roles and responsibilities at an incident.


*Department of Homeland Security*

*Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5* was signed by President George W. Bush in February of 2003. This document directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national incident management system and a national response plan to “provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”

This document contained conflicting guidance to implementation of its directives in relation to National Guard Units. The Department of Defense was exempt from direct implementation of the NIMS while States were mandated to adopt and implement NIMS to qualify for federal preparedness funds through grants.
(9) Nothing in this directive impairs or otherwise affects the authority of
the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, including the chain of
command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to the
Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command
and control procedures. The Secretary of Defense shall provide military support to
civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when
consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the
law. The Secretary of Defense shall retain command of military forces providing
civil support. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary shall establish
appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination
between their two departments. (Para. 9)

(20) Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, Federal departments and agencies
shall make adoption of NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for
providing Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or other
activities. The Secretary shall develop standards and guidelines for determining
whether a State or local entity has adopted the NIMS. (Para. 20)

National Response Plan. “The purpose of the NRP is to establish a
comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a
spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery”
(National Response Plan, 2004). This plan was signed by the Secretary, Department of
Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. By doing so he committed the Department of Defense into
“Forming and maintaining incident management partnerships with State, local, tribal, and regional entities, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations, . . . “ (p. iii).

The Federal Government could provide assistance to State and Local governments under the guidelines of the plan. The assistance could be in the form of “goods and services, financial assistance (through insurance, grants, loans and direct payments), and technical assistance” (p. 7). Assistance could be provided by a Presidential declaration alone or at the request of a Governor. A Presidential declaration without a Governor request would have to be an incident of national significance. The document stated “For Incidents of National Significance that are Presidentially declared disasters or emergencies, Federal support to States is delivered in accordance with relevant provisions of the Stafford Act” (p. 7).

Section III, Roles and Responsibilities, of this document “discusses the roles and responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental organizations and citizens involved in support of domestic incident management” (p. 8). The Governor is the State’s chief executive and:

Is the Commander-in-Chief of State military forces (National Guard when in State Active Duty or Title 32 Status and the authorized State militias); and

Requests Federal assistance when it becomes clear that State and tribal capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted. (p. 8)
However, this document also included provisions for the Department of Defense in the same Section III, *Roles and Responsibility* section. The guidance ensured autonomy to the Department of Defense while providing support to state authorities.

The Secretary of Defense authorizes Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness operations and appropriate under the circumstances of the law. The Secretary of Defense retains command of military forces under DSCA, as with all other situations and operations.

Concepts of “command” and “unity of command” have distinct legal and cultural meanings for military forces and operations. For military forces, command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of the combatant command to the commander of the forces. The “Unified Command” concept utilized by civil authorities is distinct from the military chain of command. (p. 10)

Section IV, Concept of Operations, provided insight to the legal status of National Guard forces when activated by the State Governor. Within the concept of operations section, a subsection was included that gave guidance on requesting Department of Defense Support of Civil Authorities. “Army and Air National Guard Forces: National Guard forces employed under State Active Duty or Title 32 status are providing support to the Governor of their State and are not part of Federal military response efforts” (p. 42).
National Incident Management System. The guidance for a National Incident Management System was finalized in March of 2004. The department of Homeland Security built the document and procedures based on existing Incident Command Systems and best practices found in emergency management around the country.

…“This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, local and tribal governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity, including acts of catastrophic terrorism. This document establishes the basic elements of the NIMS and provides mechanisms for the further development and refinement of supporting national standards, guidelines, protocols, systems and technologies.

Building on the foundation provided by existing incident management and emergency response systems used by jurisdictions and functional disciplines at all levels, this document integrates best practices that have proven effective over the years into a comprehensive framework for use by incident management organizations in an all hazard context (terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies) nationwide. . . . (p. ix)

The NIMS document provided guidance on the components of NIMS including Command and Management, Preparedness, Resources Management, Communications and Information Management, Supporting Technologies, and Ongoing Management and
Maintenance. The components of Command and Management and Preparedness were the most fully developed and had the most impact on governmental agencies. This was due to the many jurisdictions already using them as a standard of practice. (National Incident Management System, 2004) A review of the Command and Management component was conducted.

The Command and Management component of NIMS consisted of the Incident Command System, Multi-agency Coordination Systems and Public information systems (National Incident Management System, 2004). Chapter 2 of this document covered the Incident Command System and stated:

The ICS is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management. A basic premise of ICS is that it is widely applicable. It is used to organize both near-term and long-term field-level operations for a broad spectrum of emergencies, from small to complex incidents, both natural and manmade. ICS is use by all levels of government—Federal, State, local, and tribal—as well as by many private-sector and nongovernmental organizations. ICS is also applicable across disciplines. It is normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. (p. 7)
“The Incident Command System Organization and Operations has five major functions . . . These are command, operations, planning, logistics and finance and administrations” (National Incident Management System, 2004). However, there was also a potential for a sixth functional area of an intelligence function. The command function was reviewed for this research. The command function was broken into two general sections. The Command element and the general staff comprised the Incident Command System that was primarily used to mitigate an event.

The command element included the Incident Commander and the Command Staff. “Command Staff positions are established to assign responsibility for key activities not specifically identified in the General Staff functional elements. These positions may include the Public Information Officer (PI), Safety Officer (SO) and Liaison Officer (LNO), in addition to various others, as required and assigned by the IC” (National Incident Management System, 2004).

The General Staff included several section chiefs who had responsibilities to mitigate the incident through operations, planning, logistics and finance/administrations. The General Staff:

. . . comprises incident management personnel who represent the major functional elements of the ICS including the Operations Section Chief, Planning Section Chief, Logistics Section Chief and Finance/Administration Section Chief. . . . Command Staff and General Staff must continually interact and share vital information and estimates of the current and future situation and develop
recommended courses of action for consideration by the IC . . . (National Incident Management System, 2004)

The Command element, Incident Commander, had the ability to initiate two types of command structures within NIMS. The Single Command was a traditional approach that was commonly used when an incident was within one jurisdiction and did not cross functional boundaries. The Unified Command (UC) may be used in the event that jurisdictional or functional boundaries were crossed between agencies.

UC is an important element in multijurisdictional or multiagency domestic incident management. It provides guidelines to enable agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan and interact effectively. As a team effort, UC overcomes much of the inefficiency and duplication of effort that can occur when agencies from different functional and geographical jurisdictions, or agencies at different levels of government, operate without a common system or organizational framework. All agencies with jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for any or all aspects of an incident and those able to provide specific resource support participate in the UC structure and contribute to the process of determining overall incident strategies; selecting objectives; ensuring the joint planning for tactical activities is accomplished in accordance with approved incident objectives; ensuring the integration of tactical operations; and approving, committing, and making optimum use of all assigned resources . . . (p. 14)
Multiagency coordination systems were described in the document in great detail. These systems were better described in this research by including the entire section here.

a. Emergency Operations Center.

For purposes of this document, EOCs represent the physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support incident management activities normally takes place. The Incident Command Post (ICP) located at or in the immediate vicinity of an incident site, although primarily focused on the tactical on-scene response, may perform an EOC-like function in smaller-scale incidents or during the initial phase of the response to larger, more complex events. Standing EOCs, or those activated to support larger, more complex events, are typically established in a more central or permanently established facility; at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. EOCs are organized by major functional discipline (fire, law enforcement, medical services, and so on); by jurisdiction (city, county, region, and so on); or, more likely, by some combination thereof. Department Operations Centers (DOCs) normally focus on internal agency incident management and response and are linked to and, in most cases, are physically represented in a higher level EOC. ICPs should also be linked to DOCs and EOCs to ensure effective and efficient incident management.

For complex incidents, EOCs may be staffed by personnel representing multiple jurisdictions and functional disciplines and a wide variety of resources.
For example, a local EOC established in response to a bioterrorism incident would likely include a mix of law enforcement, emergency management, public health, and medical personnel (representatives of health care facilities, prehospital emergency medical services, patient transportation systems, pharmaceutical repositories, laboratories, etc.).

EOCs may be permanent organizations and facilities or may be established to meet temporary, short-term needs. The physical size, staffing, and equipping of an EOC will depend on the size of the jurisdiction, resources available, and anticipated incident management workload. EOCs may be organized and staffed in a variety of ways. Regardless of the specific organizational structure used, EOCs should include the following core functions: coordination; communications; resource dispatch and tracking; and information collection, analysis, and dissemination. EOCs may also support multiagency coordination and joint information activities as discussed below.

On activation of a local EOC, communications and coordination must be established between the IC or UC and the EOC, when they are not collocated. ICS field organizations must also establish communications with the activated local EOC, either directly or through their parent organizations. Additionally, EOCs at all levels of government and across functional agencies must be capable of communicating appropriately with other EOCs during incidents, including those maintained by private organizations. Communications between EOCs must be reliable and contain built-in redundancies. The efficient functioning of EOCs most frequently depends on the existence of mutual-aid agreements and joint
communications protocols among participating agencies. Such agreements are discussed in Chapter III.

b. Multiagency Coordination Entities.

When incidents cross disciplinary or jurisdictional boundaries or involve complex incident management scenarios, a multiagency coordination entity, such as an emergency management agency, may be used to facilitate incident management and policy coordination. The situation at hand and the needs of the jurisdictions involved will dictate how these multiagency coordination entities conduct their business, as well as how they are structured. Multiagency coordination entities typically consist of principals (or their designees) from organizations and agencies with direct incident management responsibility or with significant incident management support or resource responsibilities. These entities are sometimes referred to as crisis action teams, policy committees, incident management groups, executive teams, or other similar terms (For example, the wildland fire community has such an entity, the Multiagency Coordination Group (MAC Group)). In some instances, EOCs may serve a dual function as a multiagency coordination entity; in others, the preparedness organizations discussed in Chapter III may fulfill this role. Regardless of the term or organizational structure used, these entities typically provide strategic coordination during domestic incidents. If constituted separately, multiagency coordination entities, preparedness organizations, and EOCs must coordinate and communicate with one another to provide uniform and consistent guidance to incident management personnel.
Regardless of form or structure, the principal functions and responsibilities of multiagency coordination entities typically include the following:

- ensuring that each agency involved in incident management activities is providing appropriate situational awareness and resource status information;
- establishing priorities between incidents and/or Area Commands in concert with the IC or UC(s) involved;
- acquiring and allocating resources required by incident management personnel in concert with the priorities established by the IC or UC;
- anticipating and identifying future resource requirements;
- coordinating and resolving policy issues arising from the incident(s);

and

- providing strategic coordination as required.

Following incidents, multiagency coordination entities are also typically responsible for ensuring that improvements in plans, procedures, communications, staffing, and other capabilities necessary for improved incident management are acted on. These improvements should also be coordinated with appropriate preparedness organizations (see Chapter III), if these organizations are constituted separately. (National Incident Management System, 2004, p. 26-28)

**Department of Defense Requirements**

The literature review for Department of Defense documents to support question two in this research: What requirements by the Department of Defense impacted the
Battle Creek Air National Guard Base, included Department of Defense, Air Force and National Guard publications. Finally, a joint publication from all branches of the service was reviewed.

Department of Defense Publications

This literature review included a single document, Department of Defense Directive Number 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)* (1993). This document established guidelines for Active Duty and National Guard units to respond in support of Civil Authorities. The MSCA policy was that “Subject to priorities established by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all DOD resources are potentially available for MSCA” (p. 4.4.4). This policy assumed that all civil resources had been exhausted in the response and recovery efforts completed by the State and Local governments.

The planning efforts for providing military support were to take into consideration the State level response. Part of the response included the use of National Guard assets. Thus they would not be available to the federal response.

4.4.6.1 Army and Air National Guard forces, acting under State orders (i.e., not in Federal service), have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to State and local government agencies in civil emergencies.

4.4.6.2 The Army National Guard State Area Command (STARC), when ordered to Federal Active Duty, will be the DoD focal point for delivery of MSCA at State and local levels in time of war.
4.4.6.3 Plans and preparedness measures for MSCA must foster close and continuous coordination for efficient employment of DoD resources of the National Guard (whether employed under State or Federal authority), as well as resources of the DoD Components, in time of peace, war, or transition to war. (p. 6)

4.4.7 The DoD Components shall augment staffs responsible for MSCA, as appropriate, with personnel from Reserve components of all Military Services who are specifically trained for civil-military planning and emergency liaison duties. . . . The Military Service also shall ensure that all Active or Reserve component military personnel assigned or attached to FEMA are appropriately trained and employed to enhance DoD capabilities for MSCA in time of war or attack on the United States or its territories. (p. 7)

This document further refined the civil support actions by directing the Secretary of the Army to develop guidelines for the Adjutants General of every state. It directed the Secretary to:

5.7.5. Establish appropriate guidance, through the National Guard Bureau, for the Adjutants General of all 50 states….to ensure compliance by the Army National Guard with this Directive. Such guidance shall provide for the following, as appropriate:

5.7.5.1. Resourcing the STARC’s for MSCA planning and response tasks.
5.7.5.2. STARC interfaces with commands and installations of all Services, including DoD Planning Agents, and with State civil agencies.

5.7.5.3. STARC acceptance, support, and utilization of liaison and augmentation from all Military Services, as appropriate. (p. 14)

The Secretary of the Air Force was given similar guidance on planning aspects for the civilian support. The Secretary of the Air Force shall:

5.9.1. Establish appropriate guidance, through the National Guard Bureau, for the Adjutants General of all 50 states . . . to ensure compliance by the Air National Guard with this Directive.

5.9.2. Facilitate planning by the Civil Air Patrol for participation in MSCA.

5.9.3. Furnish technical advice and support for MSCA planning and implementation in areas that are uniquely within competence of the Air Force and its wartime augmentation elements . . .

5.9.4. Facilitate the conduct and coordination of aerial reconnaissance missions to perform damage assessment in support of MSCA. (p. 16)

**Air Force Instructions**

Air Force Instruction 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities* (2002) was reviewed for content relevant to the research question. This document contained similar language to DoD 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)* (1993). This
document again stated that “all resources are potentially available for MSCA” (p. 10). It also made reference to the National Guard by saying “4.3.4. National Guard forces, acting under State orders (State Militia or Title 32 status/not in Federal Service), have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to State and local government agencies in civil emergencies” (p. 11).

Air Force Instruction 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Planning and Operations* (2005) was reviewed to provide insight to the operational structure in place at Air Force and Air National Guard bases. The existing structure was different than those used by civilian counterparts in emergency response. The military responded to incidents using the terminology of Disaster Response Force (DRF), Initial Response Element (IRE) and Follow-on Elements (FOE). Disaster management and planning centers include Disaster Control Groups (DCG) and Survival Recovery Centers (SRC).

2.5.1. The planning and management element includes the FSTR Program Manager, Readiness Board (RB), Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) and the Unit Program.

2.5.2. The DRF responds to FSTR incidents. The DRF is composed of the command post and Survival Recovery Center (SRC), Disaster Control Group (DCG), Unit Control Centers (UCC), support and recovery teams and emergency services (to include Fire, Medical and Security Forces). The emergency services responders integrate the incident command system (ICS) to the maximum extent possible within the framework of the overall response effort for major accidents, natural disasters and terrorist use of WMD. The DCG will continue transitioning
continental United States (CONUS) response organizations to also fit into the overall ICS framework. The support and recovery teams are any teams that support the overall FSTR program (for example: Readiness Support Team (RST), HAZMAT Response Team, Shelter Management Team (SMT), Contamination Control Team (CCT) and Mortuary Search and Recovery Team). DCG response consists of two response elements:

2.5.2.1. The Initial Response Element (IRE) is deployed immediately to the disaster scene to provide command and control, save lives and suppress and control hazards. This element performs rescue, site security, fire fighting and medical procedures. The senior fire official takes control of the response scene until relieved by the responding DCG commander. (p. 10)

2.5.2.2. The Follow-on Element (FOE) is a response element that consists of the DCG, support and recovery teams and other support forces. They deploy to the incident (if requested) after the IRE to enhance command, control and communication. The DCG responds to peacetime major accidents and natural disasters. The DCG provides on-scene command, control and communications of military resources, as well as, cross-functional expertise. The DCG coordinates operations and support requirements with the installation and provides liaison with civil authorities and response elements. See AFMAN 32-4004, Emergency Response Operations for additional guidance and information. (p. 11)

Additionally, the Installation Commander had the responsibility to “Establish a primary and alternate SRC or equivalent (i.e. Battle Staff, Crisis Action Team) during
contingencies. . . .” and “Appoints a primary and alternate On-Scene Commander (OSC).” (p. 24) The On-Scene Commander is an “. . . Air Force unique program for individuals designated as emergency response OSCs and installation senior fire officials. Provides training on techniques and procedures necessary to effectively perform command and control functions during emergency and contingency situations involving aircraft, munitions, and hazardous material incidents, and natural disasters. OSCs are required to attend the On-Scene Commander’s course at Maxwell AFB AL (course #MLMDC 813) or the associated mobile training course” (p. 54).

During a response, the Initial Response Element would respond to an incident. Upon arrival, the Incident Commander communicated with the On-Scene Commander. The On-Scene Commander was responsible for making the decision to activate the Disaster Control Group.

5.3. Installation Response Procedures. The OSC determines if the DCG reports directly to the On Scene Control Point (OSCP) or if they should remain at a DCG assembly area and convoy to the OSCP at a later time. The OSC and FOE must follow the “safe route” provided by the senior fire official. The OSC will keep the installation commander informed. (p. 37)

5.4. Phases of Response. Phases of response to a major accident are categorized into notification, response, withdrawal and recovery. During the notification phase, the installation is notified of an actual or potential major accident. Evacuation is started (if necessary), the DRF is alerted and higher headquarters and local civil authorities are notified. During the response phase,
the IRE responds to the accident scene to establish command and control. They immediately begin life-saving actions, rescue, mitigation and containment actions. Evacuation is continued if needed. The withdrawal phase occurs when the emergency response forces are in imminent danger or if further actions are futile. Withdrawal can be immediate or planned. The recovery phase restores the area and operations to normal pre-accident conditions. The DCG develops and implements a recovery plan. The installation commander and MAJCOM approve the recovery plan. See AFMAN 32-4004 for additional information. (p. 38)


1.2. Disaster Control Group (DCG). The Air Force uses the installation DCG for initially responding to peacetime major accidents and natural disasters. It provides for on-scene command and control of military resources and functional expertise.

1.2.1. The DCG coordinates and directs operations and support requirements with the command post, unit control centers, specialized teams, and coordinates with civil and governmental authorities.

1.2.2. Primary and alternate functional representatives are required. Primary representatives should be organization commanders or chiefs; alternates
should be functional experts delegated the same authority as the primary representative.

1.2.3. Composition and responsibilities vary with the resources, capabilities, and mission of each installation. Responding functional representatives perform duties inherent to their specific mission. If support requests exceed the capability of the installation, requests should be sent to higher headquarters. The following are recommended composition and response requirements for the DCG:

1.2.4. On-Scene Commander. Support Group commander, or a designated alternate, in the grade of lieutenant colonel, GS-14, or higher. During response operations, the OSC:

• Directs actions to mitigate damage, save lives, restore primary mission assets, and assist civil authorities.

• Provides on-scene command and control of deployed elements.

• Determines the status of operations. Serves as the senior military representative until recovery operations are complete or until relieved by a higher authority or responsible agency.

• Coordinates military activities with civil authorities, as required.

• Establishes communication with the nearest military installation.

• Controls access to the accident site. Identifies authorized people to security forces.

• With the advice of the staff judge advocate, directs the establishment of national defense areas (NDA). (NDAs are not applicable in overseas areas. Units
should follow host-nation agreements.) Relay this information to the command
post and responding control group members.

• Directs the establishment of on-scene control and initial monitoring
points.

• Releases information about the emergency response operation.

• Coordinates required support for higher headquarters response elements
deployed to the scene.

• Assesses the threat of terrorists or potential protesters to response
resources at the accident scene.

• Works with mishap and accident investigation boards. (p. 3)

*National Guard Regulations*

National Guard Regulation 500-1/Air National Guard Instruction 10-8101,
*Military Support To Civil Authorities* (1996) was reviewed as it pertained specifically to
National Guard Facilities. This document “prescribes policies, procedures,
responsibilities and guidance for the employment of Army and Air National Guard units,
personnel and equipment of the several states in support of civil authorities” (p. 1).
Authority was given to the Governor as the Commander in Chief.

1-4 Authority

The governor is the commander in chief of all Army and Air National
Guard Units within his/her jurisdiction, which are not in active federal service.
This authority is derived from Article 1, Section 8, Clause 16, U.S. Constitution.
a. Governors may authorize the use of the National Guard to assist civil authorities in accordance with the State Code and/or State Constitution. During periods of state active duty, cost will be funded by the state except when federal funds are provided for counter drug activities.

b. Command of the National Guard is normally exercised through the Adjutant General or his designated military representative.

c. The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the National Guard of the District of Columbia. The National Guard may be ordered, in militia status, to aid civil authorities under Title 39 of the District of Columbia Code and Executive Order No. 11485, 3 October 1969. (p. 2)

Section 2-5 of this document outlined the National Guard Operations Support structure. The National Guard Bureau Operation Center (NGB-ARO-OMC) was operational 24 hours, 7 days a week. This office served as the lead Operations Center for The National Guard Bureau during emergencies (p. 4). A Crisis Action Team (CAT) could be activated by the Operation Center. “The CAT will bring to bear the entire capability of both the Army and Air National Guard” (p. 4). Finally, NGB Liaison Teams could be deployed to assist state and local organization.

c. Liaison Teams. During periods of emergency/crisis the deployment of an NGB Liaison Team to the affected states has been shown to improve coordination and expedite assistance. The NGB-LNO Team is composed of an LNO from NGB-ARO (Operations), ANGRC/DO (ANG Operations), NGB-ARL (Logistics), and
NGB-PA (Public Affairs). Deployment of the NGB LNO capability is the decision of the receiving TAG. . . (p. 4).

Joint Publications of the Department of Defense

Several Joint Publications were reviewed that provided insight into the activities and intentions of the Army, Air Force, Marines, Navy and Coast Guard. Two documents yielded the same basic information, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (1996) and Joint Publication 3-26, *Homeland Security* (2005). The first document provided little information as it was written prior to the National Response Plan initiative. However, Joint Publication 3-26, *Homeland Security* (2005) talked of the National Guard perspective by saying:

(b) National Guard. The NG primarily operates under three different command relationships: federal funding and federal control (10 USC); federal funding and state control (32 USC); and state status (state funding and state control). NG adjutants general and commanders are responsible for planning and training for federal and state missions. The SecDef may provide funds to a governor to employ NG units or members to conduct homeland defense activities that the SecDef determines to be necessary and appropriate for participation by the NG units or members, as the case may be. (p. II-12)
This document further recognized that civilian agencies worked under the guidelines of the *National Response Plan* (2004) and that military units were under the direction of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(e) Interagency Plans. Given the complexity and extent of federal, state, and local participation in domestic incident management, there are various operational national-level plans and agreements that depict the roles and responsibilities of participants in different incident management and emergency response circumstances. The NRP provides a “National framework” for integrating various plans and organizations involved in crisis planning and response. (p. II-16)

(3) SecDef shall retain control of assigned Title 10 military forces providing CS. The duel federal-state mission of the NG, organized under the supervision of the adjutant general and the direction of the governor in each state/territory, makes it likely that the NG will be the first military responder during a CS event. This early employment of the NG will be in advance of a formal federal response request being generated. There are advantages associated with employment of the NG in either state active duty (under state control and state funded) or Title 32 status (under state control but federally funded, usually for training or limited operations), most notably no Posse Comitatus constraints. Also, most, if not all, deployed NG forces will remain in Title 32 status throughout an event. Therefore, a combined response made up of Title 10, 14, 32
and/or state active duty forces may be employed in response to individual
incidents or events. (p. IV-1)

*State of Michigan Requirements*

The literature review for question three in this research: What State of Michigan
requirements impacted on Incident Management Systems in relation to the Battle Creek
Air National Guard Base yielded only two documents. The first was a letter from Mr. Gil
Jamieson, Acting Director of the NIMS Integration Center to the Governors of each state.
This letter outlined the important steps that should be taken by the individual states to
comply with HSPD -5, *Management of Domestic Incidents* (2004). Excerpts that were
significant to this research are:

> All Federal departments and agencies are required to adopt the NIMS and
use it in their individual domestic incident management and emergency
prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities, as well as
in support of all actions taken to assist State or local entities. The NIC is working
with Federal departments and agencies to ensure that they develop a plan to adopt
NIMS and that all fiscal year (FY) 2005 Federal preparedness assistance program
documents begin the process of addressing State, territorial, tribal, and local
NIMS implementation . . . (p. 1)

The NIMS is the nation's first-ever standardized approach to incident
management and response. The NIMS unifies Federal, State, territorial, tribal,
and local lines of government into one coordinated effort. This integrated system
makes America safer by establishing a uniform set of processes, protocols, and procedures that all emergency responders, at every level of government, will use to conduct response actions. This system ensures that those involved in emergency response operations understand what their roles are and have the tools they need to be effective.

This system encompasses much more than the Incident Command System (ICS), although ICS is a critical component of the NIMS. It also provides a common foundation for training and other preparedness efforts, communicating and sharing information with other responders and with the public, ordering resources to assist with a response effort, and for integrating new technologies and standards to support incident management. For the first time, all of the nation's emergency responders will use a common language, and a common set of procedures when working individually and together to keep America safe. The NIMS ensures that they will have the same preparation, the same goals and expectations, and most importantly, they will be speaking the same language . . .

(p. 2)

- **Institutionalizing the use of the Incident Command System (ICS)**

If State, territorial, tribal, and local entities are not already using ICS, you must institutionalize the use of ICS (consistent with the concepts and principles taught by DHS) across the entire response system. The 9/11 Commission Report recommended national adoption of the Incident Command System (ICS) to enhance command, control, and communications capabilities. All Federal, State, territory, tribal, and local jurisdictions will be required to adopt ICS in order to be
compliant with the NIMS. Additional information about adopting ICS will be provided to you by the NIC. (p. 4)


NOW, THEREFORE, I, Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of the State of Michigan, by virtue of the power and authority vested in the Governor by the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, direct the following:

1. The National Incident Management System (“NIMS”) shall be the state standard for incident management in Michigan.

2. State departments and agencies shall adopt NIMS within their departments and agencies and shall provide assistance as requested by the Department of State Police related to the implementation and maintenance of NIMS.

3. Consistent with the authority vested in the Department of State Police under the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, MCL 30.401 to 30.421, the Department of State Police is responsible within state government for implementing NIMS and monitoring compliance with this Directive. When implementing NIMS, the Department of State Police shall do all of the following:
a. Incorporate NIMS into existing emergency management and disaster preparedness training programs and exercises.

b. Ensure that federal preparedness funding, including, but not limited to, the Department of Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funds, support the implementation and maintenance of NIMS at the state, local, and tribal levels in accordance with the eligibility and allowable uses of the federal preparedness funding.


d. Promote intrastate mutual aid agreements.

e. Coordinate and provide technical assistance regarding NIMS to local and tribal governments.

f. Institutionalize the use of the Incident Command System (“ICS”).

Summary of Literature Review

In summary, a review of the available literature took a top down approach. Federal documents that impacted the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base started with the documents that crossed all jurisdictional lines. National Fire Protection Association codes and recommendations established the framework for using incident management in all facets of emergency response. Additional federal documents included Presidential Directives and Department of Homeland Security directives. These documents provided a vast amount of data in relation to question one. The literature review for question two was conducted by reviewing documents that were specific to the Department of Defense.
These documents included Joint Publications and Department of Defense publications which affected every branch of the military service, then narrowed down to United States Air Force documentation and finally Army and Air National Guard documentation. The literature review for question three produced a very small amount of data in the form of an executive order signed by the Governor of the State of Michigan and a letter to all Governor’s from the Department of Homeland Security.

Procedures

The purpose of this research project was to identify Federal, State and Department of Defense requirements in Incident Management at the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base.

This author utilized a descriptive methodology to complete the research for this paper. The primary approach was to review documents that established guidelines and procedures for incident management systems that impacted the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base. A review of Federal guidelines published by the Department of Homeland Security, President of the United States and National Fire Protection Association was conducted to provide literature for question one. A review of Department of Defense Instructions, Air Force Instructions and Army/Air National Guard Instructions pertaining to Civil Support and Incident Management was conducted for question two. Finally, a review of State of Michigan documentation from the State Emergency Management Office and the Governors executive order was conducted for question three. The results of this review were used to determine what requirements affected the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base command system.
The initial step in the process was to review literature relevant to question one. What Federal requirements impacted on incident management systems in relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base? The review of Federal requirements focused on literature that crossed many jurisdictional lines and effected emergency management organizations nationally.

A trip to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base Fire Department was made. Additional information was obtained by retrieving reference documents from the National Fire Protection Association standards. A review of Incident Management standards and training was conducted.


The next step was to review literature relevant to question two. What requirements by the Department of Defense impacted the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base? This review focused on documentation that affected the military specifically. Documents were reviewed that were published by the Department of Defense, United States Air Force, Army and Air National Guard and publications produced by the Joint Services of the Army, Air Force, Marines, Navy and Coast Guard. Documentation produced by the Department of Defense and the Joint Services was found at web site http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs, documents produced by the United States
Air Force were found at web site http://www.e-publishing.af.mil, and National Guard documentation was found at web site http://www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil. A search was conducted looking for documentation that related to Civil Support, National Response Plan and National Incident Management System as key words. The United States Air Force site also produced the Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Planning and Operations (2005) document.

The final step in the literature review was to find documentation that was relevant to question three. What State of Michigan requirements impacted on Incident Management Systems in relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base? This research began with a review of the State of Michigan Emergency Management Division at web site http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,1607,7-123-1593_3507---,00.html. This site produced Executive Directive No. 2005-9 (2005), Adoption of the National Incident Management System for Emergency Incident Management (2005) in Michigan and a letter from the director of the National Incident Management Systems Integration Center that appeared to be relevant to the state level requirements.

An evaluation of the literature found led to additional questions regarding the integration of the National Response Plan (2004) and the National Incident Management System (2004) with the current Disaster Response Plan used in the Air National Guard. Three people were contacted that could provide information relevant to the three research questions.

The first contact was made with Master Sergeant (MSG) Rick Frantz who is the Readiness Superintendent at the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base. MSG Frantz was responsible for the office that closely mirrors that of an Emergency Services Coordinator
in the local communities. He was responsible for the coordination of training, and
operations of all emergency responders within Battle Creek Air National Guard Base.

MSG Frantz was contacted at his office on the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base. His
telephone number was (269)-969-3381.

Upon completion of this interview, a general discussion was held with the Battle
Creek Air National Guard Base Wing Commander, Col. Roger Seidel. This meeting was
not in the form of a formal interview. The meeting contained two objectives. The first
was to discuss this applied research project as it pertained to the Battle Creek Air
National Guard Base and the second was to get an additional view from the command
perspective on the implementation of the National Response Plan and the National
Incident Management System and the effects it would have on the Air National Guard.
This personal communication is documented in the results section of this research. Col.
Seidel was contacted at his office on the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base, his
telephone number was (269)-969-3299.

Contact was made with Major Michael Voelker at the Michigan National Guard
Headquarters in Lansing, Michigan at telephone number (517)-483-4569. Major Voelker
worked as one of several Liaison Officers for the Michigan National Guard. This contact
was made by telephone. Major Voelker provided information relevant to past event
responses and future goals of the Michigan National Guard command staff. Major
Voelker’s comments are included in the results section of this research.

Final contact was made with Mr. Dave Swickard, who was the Command Fire
Chief for the Air National Guard. His office was located in Washington, DC. This contact
was made through Email. Mr. Swickard commented that changes were coming; however
the material was not being released to the field. The new system would alter the existing Incident Management System to mirror the national system.

Through the literature review of these documents, the author formed the discussion section of this research.

Assumptions and Limitations

A significant limitation to this research is the ability of the Military Command levels to disseminate changes in requirements. New requirements must start at the Department of Defense for review. They would establish the criteria for the Department of the Air Force to review and adapt to their structure. Those requirements are then given to the National Guard to review and implement. Each organization worked with the requirements and provides guidance on how to best implement the material. The limitation with this is that it takes months if not years for the material to filter down to the user level. By the time it is implemented at the base level, new requirements are being generated at the top to meet newer mandates. Depending on where issues are in the cycle, decisions could be affected. There was indications that the military would be releasing guidance soon that would implement the NIMS and ICS concepts (R. Frantz, personal communication, 10 January 2006; D. Swickard, personal communication, 25 January 2006).

The initial look at the National Incident Management System and its implications to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base expanded during the research to include all of the National Guard. It became apparent that the issue was larger than a single base. Due to time constraints on this project, only criteria directly relevant to Battle Creek Air National Guard Base were researched.
This lead to an assumption that the research conducted here was relevant to the National Guard as a whole. Based on the research material, it appeared that the Army and Air National Guard in Michigan faced the same dilemma. Quite possibly, the new requirement for implementation of the National Incident Management System would have the same effects on National Guard units across the country. The Army National Guard was not specifically researched for this document.

Results

Research Question 1: What federal requirements impacted on the Incident Management Systems in relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base?

National Fire Protection Association Standards

The National Fire Protection Association published several documents that the Department of Defense, United States Air Force and Air National Guard directives required to be followed.

National Fire Protection Association Standard 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program (2002) required fire department to use “An incident management system that meets the requirements of NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System, . . . ” (Para. 8.1.2). Further guidance in this document stated that the incident management system will be used in all emergency incidents, training drills and exercises.

National Fire Protection Association Standard 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System (2005) contained “the minimum requirements for an incident management system to be used by emergency services to manage all emergency incidents” (p. 1651-5). This standard applied to a number of organizations and
had a broad based application. This document defined the positions and roles of staff positions within an incident management system. “The Incident Commander shall have overall authority for management of the incident”, additional staff positions could be implemented as needed for any incident. These positions were broken down to the command staff positions of an Information Officer, Liaison Officer and Incident Safety Officer. General staff positions were identified as the Operations section, Planning section, Logistics section and Finance/Administration section. Each section had distinct roles and responsibilities at an incident.


Department of Homeland Security

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 was signed by President George W. Bush in February of 2003. This document directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a National Incident Management System and a National Response Plan to “provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”

This document contained conflicting guidance to implementation of its directives in relation to National Guard Units. The Department of Defense was exempt from direct implementation of the NIMS while States were mandated to adopt and implement NIMS to qualify for federal preparedness through grants. The Department of Defense was required to provide military support to civil authorities; however, they were granted the authority to maintain a separate chain of command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures (Para. 9).

National Response Plan. “The purpose of the NRP is to establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.” This plan was signed by the Secretary, Department of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. By doing so he committed the Department of Defense into “Forming and maintaining incident
management partnerships with State, local, tribal, and regional entities, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations . . . ” (p. iii).

The Federal Government could provide assistance to State and Local governments under the guidelines of the plan. The assistance could be in the form of “goods and services, financial assistance (through insurance, grants, loans and direct payments), and technical assistance” (p. 7). Assistance could be provided by a Presidential declaration alone or at the request of a Governor. A Presidential declaration without a Governor request would have to be an incident of national significance. All assistance that would be provided would be in accordance with the *Robert T. Stafford Act* (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 93 Pub. L. N. 288, 88 Stat. 143, 1974).

The *National Response Plan* (2005) contained guidance to the “roles and responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, private-sector and nongovernmental organizations and citizens in support of domestic incident management” (p. 8). The Governor is acknowledged as the State’s chief executive and Commander-in-Chief of State military forces. The Governor was granted the right to activate state military forces as needed in response to incidents. Those activated National Guard forces became the assets of the Governor under state activation orders.

The Department of Defense roles and responsibilities were addressed to ensure autonomy to the Department of Defense while providing support to state authorities. The Department of Defense was required to provide military assistance to the States; however, the Secretary of Defense retained command of military forces under DSCA, as with all other situations and operations. While the Secretary of Defense was given the autonomy to control military forces in support of civil authorities, the Army and Air
National Guard forces that were activated under State Active Duty or Title 32 status by the Governor were under the control of the Governor and not the Secretary of Defense.

_National Incident Management System._ The guidance for a National Incident Management System was finalized in March of 2004. The department of Homeland Security built the document and procedures based on existing Incident Command Systems and best practices found in emergency management.

The NIMS document provided guidance on the components of NIMS including Command and Management, Preparedness, Resources Management, Communications and Information Management, Supporting Technologies, and Ongoing Management and Maintenance. The components of Command and Management, and Preparedness were the most fully developed and had the most impact on governmental agencies. This was due to the many jurisdictions already using them as a standard of practice (National Incident Management System, 2004).

The Command and Management component of NIMS consisted of the Incident Command System, Multi-agency Coordination Systems and Public information systems (National Incident Management System, 2004). “The ICS is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management. A basic premise of ICS is that it is widely applicable. It is used to organize both near-term and long-term field-level operations for a broad spectrum of emergencies, from small to complex incidents, both natural and manmade. ICS is used by all levels of government—Federal, State, local, and tribal—as
well as by many private-sector and nongovernmental organizations. ICS is also applicable across disciplines. It is normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration” (p. 7).

“The Incident Command System Organization and Operations has five major functions…These are command, operations, planning, logistics and finance and administrations” (National Incident Management System, 2004, p. 12). However, there was also a potential for a sixth functional area to an intelligence function. The command function was reviewed for this research. The command function was broken into two general sections. The Command element and the general staff comprised the Incident Command System that was primarily used to mitigate events.

The command element included the Incident Commander and the Command Staff. “Command Staff positions are established to assign responsibility for key activities not specifically identified in the General Staff functional elements. These positions may include the Public Information Officer (PI), Safety Officer (SO) and Liaison Officer (LNO), in addition to various others, as required and assigned by the IC” (National Incident Management System, 2004, p. 13).

The General Staff included several section chiefs that had responsibilities to mitigate the incident through operations, planning, logistics and finance/administrations. The Command element could initiate either a Single Command or a Unified Command. The Unified Command would involve several agencies that cross jurisdictional lines. Multi-agency coordination systems were available to the Incident Commander that included the implementation of Emergency Response Centers at the Federal, State and
Local levels and Multi-agency Coordination Groups. This guidance emphasized the need to coordinate and communicate with one another to provide uniform and consistent guidance to incident management personnel regardless of what system was used (National Incident Management System, 2004, p. 26-28).

Research Question 2: What requirements by the Department of Defense impacted the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base?

Department of Defense Guidance

Department of Defense guidance to Civil Authorities was outlined in Department of Defense Directive Number 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) (1993). Guidelines were established for Active Duty and National Guard units to respond in support of Civil Authorities. The MSCA policy was that “Subject to priorities established by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all DOD resources are potentially available for MSCA” (p. 4.4.4). This policy assumed that all civil resources had been exhausted in the response and recovery efforts.

The planning efforts for providing military support were to take into consideration the State level response. It was recognized that the State military personnel would not be available for a federal military response. The Secretary of the Army was directed to develop guidelines that took this into consideration for the Adjutants General of every state.

The Secretary of the Air Force was given similar guidance on planning aspects for the civilian support. The Secretary of the Air Force was directed to provide guidance to the National Guard Bureau for the Adjutant General’s of every state to ensure compliance by the National Guard.
Air Force Requirements

Air Force Instruction 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, (2002) provided insight to the Air Force perspective of supporting Civil Authorities. The guidance was similar to DoD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)* (1993). All military resources were potentially available for MSCA. Further guidance gave the National Guard primary responsibility for providing military assistance to State and local government agencies in civil emergencies (p. 11).

Air Force Instruction 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Planning and Operations* (2005) provided insight to the operational structure in place at Air Force and Air National Guard bases. The existing structure was different than those used by civilian counterparts in emergency response. The military bases responded to incidents using terminology of Disaster Response Force (DRF), Initial Response Element (IRE) and Follow-on Elements (FOE). Disaster management and planning centers include Disaster Control Groups (DCG) and Survival Recovery Centers (SRC). The DRF was composed of the command post and Survival Recovery Center (SRC), Disaster Control Group (DCG), Unit Control Centers (UCC), support and recovery teams and emergency services (to include Fire, Medical and Security Forces). The support and recovery teams were any teams that supported the overall FSTR program (for example: Readiness Support Team (RST), HAZMAT Response Team, Shelter Management Team (SMT), Contamination Control Team (CCT) and Mortuary Search and Recovery Team).

The Disaster Control Group response consisted of two response elements, the Initial Response Element (IRE) and the Follow-On Element (FOE). The IRE was deployed immediately to the disaster scene to provide command and control, save lives
and suppress and control hazards. This element performed rescue, site security, fire fighting and medical procedures. The senior fire official took control of the response scene until relieved by the responding DCG commander. “The Follow-on Element (FOE) is a response element that consists of the DCG, support and recovery teams and other support forces. They deploy to the incident (if requested) after the IRE to enhance command, control and communication. The DCG responds to peacetime major accidents and natural disasters. The DCG provides on-scene command, control and communications of military resources, as well as, cross-functional expertise. The DCG coordinates operations and support requirements with the installation and provides liaison with civil authorities and response elements. See AFMAN 32-4004, Emergency Response Operations for additional guidance and information” (p. 11).

Additionally, the Installation Commander had the responsibility to “Establish a primary and alternate SRC or equivalent (i.e. Battle Staff, Crisis Action Team) during contingencies. …” and “Appoints a primary and alternate on-scene commander (OSC)” (p. 24). The On-Scene Commander (OSC) was an Air Force “unique program for individuals designated as emergency response OSCs and installation senior fire officials. Provides training on techniques and procedures necessary to effectively perform command and control functions during emergency and contingency situations involving aircraft, munitions, and hazardous material incidents, and natural disasters. OSCs are required to attend the On-Scene Commander’s course at Maxwell AFB AL (course #MLMDC 813) or the associated mobile training course” (p. 54).

During a response, the IRE would respond to an incident. Upon arrival, the Incident Commander communicated with the On-Scene Commander. The On-Scene
Commander made the decision to activate the Disaster Control Group. The DCG would assemble at a designated assembly area and wait for the On-Scene Commander to direct them to the incident site if needed. The DCG supported the IRE during the mitigation phase of the incident and was later responsible for planning and coordinating the recovery phase.

Air Force Instruction 32-4004, *Emergency Response Operations* (1999) provided detailed roles and responsibilities of the Disaster Control Group during incidents. The DCG was used to provide on-scene command and control of military resources when responding to major accidents or natural disasters. The DCG coordinated and directed operations and support requirements with the command post, unit control centers, specialized teams, and coordinated with civil and governmental authorities. The composition of the DCG varied with the resources, capabilities, and mission of each installation. Every DCG was directed to implement actions that would reduce damage, save lives, restore primary mission assets and assist civil authorities as needed. They were also directed to coordinate military activities with those civil authorities.

*National Guard Regulations*

National Guard Regulation 500-1/Air National Guard Instruction 10-8101, *Military Support To Civil Authorities* (1996) “prescribes policies, procedures, responsibilities and guidance for the employment of Army and Air National Guard units, personnel and equipment of the several states in support of civil authorities” (p. 1). Authority was given to the Governor as the Commander in Chief to authorize the use of National Guard Assets that were not already in use by the federal government. However, during periods of state active duty, cost would be funded by the state except when federal
funds were provided for counter drug activities. The Command of the National Guard would be the responsibility of Adjutant General or his designated military representative.

The National Guard Operations Support structure consisted of the National Guard Bureau Operation Center (NGB-ARO-OMC) which was operational 24 hours, 7 days a week. This office served as the lead Operations Center for The National Guard Bureau during emergencies (p. 4). A Crisis Action Team (CAT) could be activated by the Operation Center. “The CAT will bring to bear the entire capability of both the Army and Air National Guard” (p. 4). NGB Liaison Teams could be deployed to assist state and local organizations during periods of emergency/crisis. “The deployment of an NGB Liaison Team to the affected states has been shown to improve coordination and expedite assistance. The NGB-LNO Team is composed of an LNO from NGB-ARO (Operations), ANGRC/DO (ANG Operations), NGB-ARL (Logistics), and NGB-PA (Public Affairs). Deployment of the NGB LNO capability is the decision of the receiving TAG. . . . (p. 4).

Joint Publications

Joint Publications of the Department of Defense provided insight into the activities and intentions of the Army, Air Force, Marines, Navy and Coast Guard. Two documents yielded the same basic information, Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (1996) and Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security (2005). The first document provided little information as it was written prior to the National Response Plan initiative. However, Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security (2005) talked of the National Guard perspective. It was recognized that the National Guard “primarily operated under three different command relationships: federal funding and federal control (10 USC); federal funding and state control (32 USC); and
state status (state funding and state control)” (p. II-12). National Guard adjutants general and commanders were responsible for planning and training for federal and state missions.

This document further recognized that civilian agencies worked under the guidelines of the National Response Plan (2004) and that military units would be under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary was to retain control of the military forces that provided civil support, however, the Secretary must also recognize that “The duel federal-state mission of the NG, organized under the supervision of the adjutant general and the direction of the governor in each state/territory, makes it likely that the NG will be the first military responder during a CS event. This early employment of the NG will be in advance of a formal federal response request being generated. There are advantages associated with employment of the NG in either state active duty (under state control and state funded) or Title 32 status (under state control but federally funded, usually for training or limited operations), most notably no Posse Comitatus constraints. Also, most, if not all, deployed NG forces will remain in Title 32 status throughout an event. Therefore, a combined response made up of Title 10, 14, 32 and/or state active duty forces may be employed in response to individual incidents or events” (p. IV-1).

Research Question 3: What State of Michigan requirements impacted on Incident Management Systems in relation to the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base?

State of Michigan Requirements

A letter from Mr. Gil Jamieson, Acting Director of the NIMS Integration Center to the Governors of each state provided insight to question three. This letter outlined the important steps that should be taken by the individual states to comply with Homeland

All Federal departments and agencies are required to adopt the NIMS and use it in their individual domestic incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist State or local entities. The NIC is working with Federal departments and agencies to ensure that they develop a plan to adopt NIMS and that all fiscal year (FY) 2005 Federal preparedness assistance program documents begin the process of addressing State, territorial, tribal, and local NIMS implementation…. (p. 1)

The NIMS is the nation's first-ever standardized approach to incident management and response. The NIMS unifies Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local lines of government into one coordinated effort. This integrated system makes America safer by establishing a uniform set of processes, protocols, and procedures that all emergency responders, at every level of government, will use to conduct response actions. This system ensures that those involved in emergency response operations understand what their roles are and have the tools they need to be effective.

This system encompasses much more than the Incident Command System (ICS), although ICS is a critical component of the NIMS. It also provides a common foundation for training and other preparedness efforts, communicating and sharing information with other responders and with the public, ordering
resources to assist with a response effort, and for integrating new technologies and standards to support incident management. For the first time, all of the nation's emergency responders will use a common language, and a common set of procedures when working individually and together to keep America safe. The NIMS ensures that they will have the same preparation, the same goals and expectations, and most importantly, they will be speaking the same language. . . . (p. 2)

- **Institutionalizing the use of the Incident Command System (ICS)**

If State, territorial, tribal, and local entities are not already using ICS, you must institutionalize the use of ICS (consistent with the concepts and principles taught by DHS) across the entire response system. The 9/11 Commission Report recommended national adoption of the Incident Command System (ICS) to enhance command, control, and communications capabilities. All Federal, State, territory, tribal, and local jurisdictions will be required to adopt ICS in order to be compliant with the NIMS. Additional information about adopting ICS will be provided to you by the NIC. (p. 4)

In response to this letter from Mr. Gil Jaimson, on September 29, 2005, Governor Jennifer Granholm signed Executive Directive Number 2005-9, Adoption of the *National Incident Management System (NIMS) for Emergency Management in Michigan* (2005). This document formally adopted the NIMS as the state standard for incident management. It required state departments to adopt NIMS. The Department of State Police was to provide assistance as requested to implement the system. The Department
of State Police was required to incorporate the NIMS into the existing emergency management and disaster preparedness training programs. The NIMS was also incorporated into the Emergency Management Plan for the State of Michigan.

*Interviews and Personal Communications*

Master Sergeant Rick Frantz who is the Readiness Superintendent at the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base provided information that was relevant to all three research questions. An interview was conducted. Ten questions were asked in the interview. The questions and responses to that interview were:

**Question 1.** What is your current job position or positions that provides you knowledge of Incident Management System? **Response:** Readiness (Disaster Preparedness) Superintendent.

**Question 2.** What is your current level of training in the National Incident Management System? **Response:** FEMA Introduction Certificate (IS-00700)

**Question 3.** You have knowledge and training in the Air National Guard Disaster response process and the National Incident Management System. What do you see as the major differences in the way the two systems operate? **Response:** The Air National Guard Disaster Response Force (DRF) and the Disaster Control Group are response agencies that are formed to respond to and recover from disasters that happen in and around a local base. Working in unison and at the direction of the Base Command Post (CP) they insure all interests of the Air National Guard, the United States Air Force, and the Department of Defense are complied with according to specific regulations and checklists. The National Incident Management System allows for a Unified Command System allowing the Incident Command System to operate in a professional environment when more than
one jurisdiction is involved and the incident has included more than one governmental agency.

Question 4. The National Guard currently utilizes a Liaison Officer at the State Emergency Operating Center during emergencies or disasters. The Liaison Officer takes information from the EOC and provides it to the AG who then deploys National Guard Assets. Do you see this as an adequate process in NIMS system? Response: The military State Emergency Liaison Officer is a great asset that allows two way communications between the military agency(s) involved in the incident and the Adjutant General. The AG can then make informed decisions as to the proper course of action(s) taken during the event. The AG can then brief their superiors as to the response and strength of the units involved.

Question 5. You have worked in both systems, do you believe that the military can effectively implement National Incident Management System IAW the National Response Plan and still function in the contingency environment? Response: Yes, Interoperability between functions and jurisdictions allows for a smooth process within the Emergency Management Process.

Question 6. The active duty Air Force is somewhat slow to provide guidance on implementation, in whole or part, of the National Incident Management System. What do you believe should be the Air National Guards action in regards to this decision? Response: The Air National Guard should lead the way in this process. The National Guard in any state is controlled by the governor of that state. The major difference between an active Air Force and an Air National Guard unit is in the type of mission they
have. An Air Force base is more self contained and self sufficient and an Air National Guard base is an actual part of the local community.

Question 7. If the active duty Air Force does not completely adopt the National Incident Management System as intended, do you believe that the Air National Guard should still train to function within the system? Why? Response: Yes, As this system matures it will be imperative that local bases fall within the plan in order to work alongside their civilian counterparts to obtain and receive support during an incident.

Question 8. It appears that the Air National Guard is somewhat behind in adopting, training and implementing the National Incident Management System as directed by Presidential Directive 5, would you agree with this? Response: Yes although this is a new program that has only been around for a few years and as we know it takes a long time for directives, instructions, and policies to be written, reviewed, changed, and accepted at all levels of government before they make it to the local level. Once the program makes it to the local level local Operating Instructions need to be written, reviewed, changed, and approved before any program can be accepted. Then individuals must be trained in the program and reach a certain level of knowledge in order to train the other individuals within their control.

Question 9. What is your perspective on the past and/or future effectiveness of inter-agency operations between federal, state and local authorities if the Air National Guard does not adopt the National Incident Management System, but continues with the current Disaster Control Group process? Response: I feel that we will have the best of both worlds if we can train and equip our bases with the proper tools and trained
personnel to function within the boundaries of the National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan.

Question 10. Do you have any other information that would be helpful in this project? Response: Most systems fail when units and or individuals do not take an objective look and make informed decisions regarding new processes. The National Incident Management System and National Response Plan can work if it is given a fair evaluation and all parties work together to make a good system even better.

A formal interview was not conducted with Battle Creek Air National Guard Wing Commander Col. Roger Seidel, however a general discussion provided some information that was relevant to the research questions. Col. Seidel supported the concept that the National Guard had both a federal and state mission and could be activated by the Governor to assist with civil authorities. However, the current process of Emergency Management is the Disaster Control Group that functions with an Incident Command System. The idea of implementing a completely separate system would prove very difficult. The training aspects alone would increase the work load on the National Guard. The existing usage of the National Guard by the Department of Defense resembled that of an active duty component. Operational tasking and training to support existing federal requirements were already extremely taxing on National Guard units. The National Guard supported these operations with a minimal full time staff, and traditional guard members that were only available for training two days per month. Adding additional NIMS training to the existing combat readiness and disaster response training could result in reduced preparedness for both military operations and disaster response. Even as the operation and training requirements increase, the available time for guard members stays
the same. It would be best if one system could be used (R. Seidel, personal communication, 10 January 2006).

Finally, Major Michael Voelker was contacted at the Michigan National Guard State Headquarters. The Adjutant General had expressed a profound interest in the National Guard possessing the ability to operate in a coordinated effort with the State and local communities. Since the State Emergency Response Plan called for the use of the National Response Plan (2005) and the National Incident Management System (2005), the Michigan National Guard must be familiar with the system and be able to function within its parameters. Recent events such as the coordination of evacuees from Hurricane Katrina showed the need for a higher level of coordination between civil and military authorities to ensure and efficient and successful completion of events (M. Voelker, personal communication, 15 January 2006).

Discussion

The data indicated that development of the National Response Plan (2004) by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (2004) was an attempt to get the nation on a single emergency response process to natural disasters and terrorist events. The concept was to develop and implement a plan that would provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity (National Response Plan, 2004). While this plan called for a uniform approach to emergency management, it was also recognized that the Department of Defense had unique responsibilities and mission requirements that necessitated a different command structure (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, 2004).
Secretary of Defense, Ronald H. Rumsfeld signed the plan that included the requirement to form and maintain incident management partnerships with State and local communities while working within the federal laws governing military intervention into civilian affairs. The *Robert T. Stafford Act* (1974) prohibited direct federal military intervention into civil matters without a presidentially declared disaster and clear direction to provide support (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 1974).

Despite the need for a command structure that was efficient in military operations, the Department of Defense was committed to understanding the *National Response Plan* (2004) which included the *National Incident Management System* (2004). Further development and integration of the military into the process was addressed at the Air Force (Air Force Instruction 10-802, 2002), and National Guard levels (National Guard Regulation 500-1/Air National Guard Instruction 10-8101, 1996). Each command level recognized the National Guard as an asset that could be used as a federal or state resource (Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-08, 1996). The National Guard could be activated by each state governor and would be funded by the state. When an activation of this nature took place, the assets were not under the control of the Department of Defense, but were under the control of the respective Governor as the Commander-In-Chief of state militaries (National Response Plan, 2004). The state governor would in turn place the assets under the command of the Adjutant General for the state (National Guard Regulation 500-1/Air National Guard Instruction 10-8101, 1996). These assets would presumably be working within the state or local communities Emergency Response Plan, which included the NIMS process.
This created a conflict for the National Guard. The National Guard was already being used at an extremely high operational tempo by the Department of Defense. Adding additional training requirements as well as a second Incident Management System would be difficult to accomplish (R. Seidel, personal communication, 10 January 2006). The National Guard already had a Liaison Officer in place to coordinate activities between the State Emergency Operations Center and the National Guard (National Guard Regulation 500-1/Air National Guard Instruction 10-8101, 1996). This Officer could coordinate the activities at the State level of command; however, any local Emergency Operation Center that would be coordinating emergency activities would not have direct communications with military assets in the area that understood the NIMS process.

The major differences in the command and control process was mainly in terminology, however, some structural differences were noted. The National Guard structure utilized Disaster Response Force (DRF) that included a Disaster Control Group (DCG), Initial Response Element (IRE) and Follow-on Elements (FOE). Additionally, the military command structure included an On-Scene Commander that coordinated activities between the IRE and the DCG (Air Force Instruction 10-2501, 2005). The Incident Command System did not contain such terminology or positions within its structure (National Incident Management System, 2004). The data suggested that the IRE which included the Senior Fire Officer or Senior Security Officer would have a more profound role in the NIMS than in the DCG concept. The initial response of both organizations was being accomplished using an Incident Command System.

Management System (2004) being reviewed at all levels of the military for future implementation (R. Frantz, personal communication, 10 January 2006: M. Voelker, personal communication, 19 December 2005). The military was going to attempt to implement the concept into the existing emergency response plans and organization. However, those implemented procedures are usually modified from the existing concepts. This provided little solid evidence that the military guidance would mesh smoothly with the NIMS being used by the state and local organizations.

Guidance to determine which system that National Guard units would have to work in could not be found. While many documents included language to keep the military under the control of military commanders, in a state activation, the Adjutant General would be working directly for the Governor. The Governor had directed all state agencies to adopt and implement NIMS (Executive Directive No. 2005-9, 2005). Did this include the National Guard while under state activation? This question was not really answered in the data presented. The data did indicate that it is the desire of the President of the United States (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, 2003) and Secretary of Defense (Department of Defense Instruction Number 3025.1, 1993) that the military be able to function in a manner that would lead to effective and efficient mitigation of any incident.

Recommendations

The problem, as previously stated, was that the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base was governed by Federal, State and Department of Defense agencies that had different requirements for Incident Management Systems. The BCANG had not identified the implications of the NIMS on the command system which could cause
inefficiencies in providing support services within the scope of the National Response Plan. While no single document, regulation, law or standard provided all the necessary data to identify this as a problem, the assembly and evaluation of the many pieces of literature found in this study seem to reveal that the problem is real and has an impact on the Department of Defense, State of Michigan and Michigan National Guard.

The available data did not produce the sought guidance to make a recommendation on a standardized Incident Management System for the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base to use that would ensure effective and efficient operations with Civilian counterparts. However, the data did provide an indication that the future would include changes in how the National Guard would operate when conducting operations during natural disasters and terrorist events. The Federal response would include a military response that more closely resembled that of the civilian emergency response organization.

In the interim of waiting for Department of Defense and Air Force Instructions implementing the National Response Plan (2004) and the National Incident Management System (2004) the Michigan National Guard and specifically the Battle Creek Air National Guard Base should start the process by implementing training that can be completed with little effect on the current operations. Training requirements for State and local agencies include introductory courses that are short duration and can be completed through the internet. Through the completion of the introductory courses, military personnel should be able to understand the minimum terminology and organizational structure of local emergency response organizations. By completing the introductory
training early, transition to a NIMS compatible Incident Management System should be accomplished with minimal time and effort, and at a pace more conducive to learning.

Finally, the Battle Creek Air National Guard can take a lead roll in implementing processes that support the NIMS system. As an Air National Guard Base, major incidents are more likely to include elements of the local community to mitigate. Mutual aid agreements that are already in place and activated will surely trigger an emergency management system that is different than the DCG process. Trigger events at the local level would include responses from multi-jurisdictional agencies prior to the State Emergency Operations Center being activated. By the time a State Level EOC and a Military Liaison Officer are in place, local EOC’s are already being opened and operating. National Guard units are a part of the local community and viewed as a very good asset to provide assistance at the onset of major events. They could very well be in coordination with a local EOC and the NIMS concept before being directed to do so by Presidential or Governor Directives.
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